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ABSTRACT
The past decades have witnessed a dramatic shift in the visibility,
acceptance, and integration of transgender people across all aspects of
culture and the law. The treatment of incarcerated transgender people is no
exception. Historically, transgender people have been routinely denied
access to medically necessary hormone therapy, surgery, and other genderaffirming procedures; subjected to cross-gender strip searches; and housed
according to their birth sex. But these policies and practices have begun to
change. State departments of corrections are now providing some, though
by no means all, appropriate care to transgender people, culminating in the
Ninth Circuit’s historic decision in Edmo v. Corizon, Inc. in 2019—the first
circuit-level case to require a state to provide transition surgery to an
incarcerated transgender person. Other state departments of corrections
will surely follow, as they must under the Eighth Amendment. These
momentous changes, which coincide with a broader cultural turn away from
transphobia and toward a collective understanding of transgender people,
have been neither swift nor easy. But they trend in one direction: toward a
recognition of the rights and dignity of transgender people.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 15, 2020, in Bostock v. Clayton County, the U.S. Supreme
Court issued a landmark decision for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,
and queer (“LGBTQ”) movement.1 In an opinion with sweeping
consequences, the Court interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act’s
prohibition on “sex” discrimination to include discrimination based on
transgender status.2 According to the Court, “The statute’s message for our
cases is . . . simple and momentous: An individual’s homosexuality or
1.
2.

Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
Id.
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transgender status is not relevant to employment decisions. That’s because it
is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or
transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex.”3
As the Court’s dissenters rightly predicted, Bostock’s holding “is virtually
certain to have far-reaching consequences,” given that over one hundred
federal statutes and the Federal Equal Protection Clause prohibit sex-based
discrimination.4
As legal barriers to transgender equality fall, this Article addresses one
barrier that Bostock did not directly reach: the denial of medical care to
incarcerated transgender people in violation of the Eighth Amendment.5 The
past two decades have witnessed a dramatic shift in corrections facilities
providing some, though by no means all, appropriate care to transgender
people, culminating in the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari on October
13, 2020 in Edmo v. Corizon, Inc.—the first circuit-level case to require a
state department of corrections to provide transition surgery to an
incarcerated transgender person.6
This Article traces the historic strides that incarcerated transgender
people have made under the Eighth Amendment, from the rejection of
policies that house transgender people based on their birth sex, to the
requirement that prison officials provide transgender people with access to
hormone therapy, social transition, and, most recently, transition surgery.7
Changes in prison practices and policies toward incarcerated transgender
people, although neither swift nor easy, trend in one direction: toward a
recognition of the rights and dignity of transgender people. These

3. Id. at 1741.
4. Id. at 1778 (Alito & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Although Bostock was a Title VII case, courts
routinely look to Title VII when interpreting other sex discrimination statutes and the Equal Protection
Clause. See, e.g., Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 616–17 (4th Cir. 2020) (applying
Title VII case law to Title IX and equal protection claims); Adams ex rel. Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns
Cnty., 968 F.3d 1286, 1305 (11th Cir. 2020) (same); Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1047 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Although not as often as some of our
sister circuits, this court has looked to Title VII when construing Title IX.”); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d
1312, 1316–18 (11th Cir. 2011) (applying Title VII case law to equal protection claims); Smith v. City
of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist.,
365 F.3d 107, 117–21 (2d Cir. 2004) (same).
5. Because Bostock has been interpreted to apply to discrimination based on transgender status
under the Equal Protection Clause, it has important implications for incarcerated transgender people who
are denied medically necessary care. See, e.g., Grimm, 972 F.3d at 616–617 (applying Title VII case law
to Title IX and equal protection claims); Adams ex rel. Kasper, 968 F.3d at 1305 (same).
6. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied, 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir.
2020) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 141 S. Ct. 610 (2020). Transition
surgery refers to a range of procedures that change one’s primary and/or secondary sex characteristics,
including surgery on the breasts or chest, external or internal genitalia, and facial features. See discussion
infra Section II.A.1.
7. See infra Parts II–III.
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momentous changes in the prison context coincide with a broader cultural
turn away from transphobia and toward a collective understanding of
transgender people and the medical care essential to transgender people’s
health and well-being.8
Part I of this Article provides a snapshot of the historic progress that
transgender people have made in recent decades, both culturally and under
the law.9 From sustained mass media attention to expressions of solidarity
from celebrities and faith, business, and political leaders, transgender
people’s voices are resonating throughout American culture. And the
momentous legal gains achieved during the administration of President
Barack Obama, although temporarily halted in some cases during his
successor’s term, continue under President Joe Biden. Part II turns to the
success of incarcerated transgender people in securing their rights under the
Eighth Amendment, which is emblematic of the historic progress of
transgender people.10 In recent years, courts have ruled in favor of
incarcerated transgender people who were denied access to medically
necessary care, including hormone therapy, commissary items, and genderappropriate strip-searches and housing. Part III discusses the most recent and
consequential development in the rights of incarcerated transgender people:
the Ninth Circuit’s historic decision in Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., which affirmed
a district court order requiring a state department of corrections to provide
transition surgery to an incarcerated transgender woman.11 The Conclusion
of this Article offers some closing remarks.12
I. THE PROGRESS OF TRANSGENDER PEOPLE IN CULTURE AND
IN LAW
The past decades have witnessed dramatic shifts in the visibility,
acceptance, and integration of transgender people across all aspects of
culture. Nearly a century of sensationalized media depictions of transgender
people have been replaced by “an explosion of mainstream media
representations of trans issues actually produced by and inclusive of trans
people,” and by user-generated, trans-inclusive content on social media.13
Summer camps, books, and other resources have helped parents support their
transgender children.14 LGBTQ peer support groups, in person and on social
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
2017).
14.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Conclusion.
SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY: THE ROOTS OF TODAY’S REVOLUTION 195 (2d ed.
Id. at 199.
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media, have helped transgender youth find and build community.15 Medical
and social science have informed society’s understanding of gender identity
and the transgender community.16 Workplaces and schools have adopted
policies that support transgender health and safety.17 An overwhelming
majority of Americans support allowing transgender people to serve openly
in the U.S. military.18 Many faith communities have begun to welcome and
support transgender people.19 And private businesses have publicly
expressed solidarity with transgender people, most notably by cancelling
planned business investments, conferences, concerts, and sporting events—
including the 2017 NCAA men’s basketball playoffs—in response to a North
Carolina law that stripped transgender people of local civil rights protections
and required that they use bathrooms based on their birth sex rather than their
lived identities.20
Additionally, transgender-led grassroots activism, nascent in the 1950s,
has grown into a powerful social and political force, helping to shape
national policies that affect transgender people and influencing other
grassroots movements, most notably Black Lives Matter, which have
embraced and advanced the rights of transgender people.21 A national
conversation about gender has changed the way we talk, with growing
acceptance of gender-neutral honorifics and pronouns; the way we express
ourselves, with youth fashion trends that blur the line between traditional
men’s and women’s clothing; and the accommodations we use, with the
15. Colt Keo-Meier & Lance Hicks, Youth, in TRANS BODIES, TRANS SELVES: A RESOURCE FOR
THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 446, 460–61 (Laura Erickson-Schroth ed., 2014).
16. See, e.g., WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE
HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER-NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 5 (7th ed. 2012)
[hereinafter WPATH STANDARDS], https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/SOC%20v7/SOC
%20V7_English2012.pdf?_t=1613669341 [https://perma.cc/7FK3-WH7L]; Genny Beemyn, U.S.
History, in TRANS BODIES, TRANS SELVES: A RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 501, 501–
32 (Laura Erickson-Schroth ed., 2014).
17. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND., CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2021 6, 18 (2021)
[hereinafter HRC INDEX], https://hrc-prod-requests.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/CEI-2021_FINAL.
pdf?mtime=20210128123716&focal=none [https://perma.cc/A7GQ-3L8T]; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
EXAMPLES OF POLICIES AND EMERGING PRACTICES FOR SUPPORTING TRANSGENDER STUDENTS 1–15
(2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/851001/download [https://perma.cc/XL6P-WS74].
18. Justin McCarthy, In U.S., 71% Support Transgender People Serving in Military, GALLUP (June
20, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/258521/support-transgender-people-serving-military.aspx [https:
//perma.cc/UQ2G-UQP3].
19. See Delfin Bautista, Quince Mountain, & Heath Mackenzie Reynolds, Religion and
Spirituality, in TRANS BODIES, TRANS SELVES: A RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 62,
65–71 (Laura Erickson-Schroth ed., 2014) (discussing inclusion of transgender people in Christianity,
Islam, Judaism, and Hinduism); see also Christina Morales, Hundreds of Religious Leaders Call for End
to L.G.B.T.Q. Conversion Therapy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/
world/conversion-therapy-pledge.html [https://perma.cc/5NXP-J8LC].
20. STRYKER, supra note 13, at 223; Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act of 2016, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-521.2 (2016), repealed by An Act to Reset, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 4.
21. STRYKER, supra note 13, at 210.
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proliferation of all gender restrooms.22 Further, support for transgender
people has come from the very highest levels of government: in 2015, the
country’s first African-American president, Barack Obama, became the first
president to use the word “transgender” in a State of the Union; in 2012, then
vice president, now president, Joe Biden called transgender discrimination
“the civil rights issue of our time”;23 and transgender representation
continues to expand in statehouses, courthouses, agencies, mayorships, and
city councils throughout the country.24
The progress of transgender people is also evident in law. In recent
years, transgender people have successfully challenged laws and practices
that have historically excluded and otherwise discriminated against them.
Specifically, transgender people have relied on federal, state, and local antidiscrimination laws, as well as federal and state constitutional law, to
challenge discrimination in the workplace, such as termination, harassment,
and the denial of equal employment benefits;25 discrimination in schools,
such as the refusal to permit transgender boys to use the boys’ communal use
restroom or girls to use the girls’ one;26 and discrimination in healthcare,
such as the exclusion of transition-related care in state Medicaid plans and
the denial of coverage of appropriate care by healthcare providers.27 In 2010,
transgender people successfully argued before the U.S. Tax Court that
hormone therapy and transition-related surgeries are tax-deductible medical
expenses.28 And in 2015, transgender people successfully claimed protection
under the Americans with Disabilities Act for discrimination based on
gender dysphoria.29
In addition to these court victories, transgender people have
successfully advocated for federal, state, and local legislation and
administrative policies that further the rights of transgender people. At the
federal level, Congress passed the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr.,
Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, which allows federal criminal
prosecution of hate crimes motivated by the victim’s actual or perceived
sexual orientation or gender identity.30 The following year, Congress passed
22.
23.

Id. at 201, 220.
Id. at 218; Alexandra Jaffe, Obama Makes Historic Transgender’ Reference in SOTU, CNN:
POLITICS (Jan. 20, 2015, 11:55 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/01/20/politics/obama-transgendersotu/index.html [https://perma.cc/T8J5-UYRW].
24. STRYKER, supra note 13, at 224.
25. See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
26. See, e.g., Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 593–94 (4th Cir. 2020).
27. See, e.g., Flack v. Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs., 328 F. Supp. 3d 931, 934 (W.D. Wis. 2018).
28. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 76–77 (2010).
29. Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75665, at *8–11
(E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017).
30. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 18 U.S.C. § 249.
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the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, which among other
things, prohibits sex discrimination by health providers.31 Under the Obama
administration, the State Department updated its requirements for amending
federal identity documents such as passports and social security cards,
aligning these requirements with a contemporary understanding of the
medical needs of transgender people.32 Heralding the Supreme Court’s
holding in Bostock in 2020, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ruled in 2012 that employment discrimination against a
transgender person is sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.33 In 2014, the Department of Health and Human Services
invalidated its 1989 determination denying Medicare coverage of transition
surgery.34 In 2015, the Obama administration barred federal contractors from
discriminating based on gender identity and sexual orientation.35 In 2016,
the Departments of Justice and Education released joint guidance to protect
the rights of transgender students in school.36 On January 20, 2021, the day
of his inauguration, President Biden issued a sweeping executive order
requiring all federal agencies to review their regulations and policies and
revise them to comply with Bostock’s holding that discrimination “because
of . . . sex” includes discrimination based on gender identity and sexual
orientation.37 Five days later, on January 25, 2021, President Biden revoked
the Trump administration’s ban on transgender people serving in the U.S.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a); see also Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/section1557/index.html [https://perma.cc/NM4W-62RM].
32. See Kylar W. Broadus & Shannon Price Minter, Legal Issues, in TRANS BODIES, TRANS
SELVES: A RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 174, 178–80 (Laura Erickson-Schroth ed.,
2014).
33. Macy v. Holder, EEOC Decision No. 0120120821, 2012 EEOPUB LEXIS 1181, at *33–34
(Apr. 20, 2012).
34. NCD 140.3, Transsexual Surgery, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (May 30, 2014),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-decisions/2014/dab2576.pdf [https://
perma.cc/72TE-JXDV].
35. Secretary Thomas E. Perez, Another Step Toward Equality for LGBT Workers, OBAMA WHITE
HOUSE (Apr. 8, 2015, 10:57 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/04/08/another-steptoward-equality-lgbt-workers [https://perma.cc/XXG3-WDEC].
36. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON TRANSGENDER
STUDENTS (May 13, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ixtransgender.pdf [https://perma.cc/DYW5-HA5R]. In 2017, the Trump administration rescinded this
guidance, citing, inter alia, a federal district court’s holding “that the term ‘sex’ unambiguously refers to
biological sex” and stating that “there must be due regard for the primary role of the States and local
school districts in establishing educational policy.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR
COLLEAGUE LETTER 1 (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/942021/download [https://
perma.cc/M32L-B4NH].
37. Exec. Order No. 13988, 86 Fed. Reg. 7023 (Jan. 20, 2021); see also Executive Order on
Preventing and Combating Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity or Sexual Orientation, WHITE
HOUSE (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/
executive-order-preventing-and-combating-discrimination-on-basis-of-gender-identity-or-sexual-orien
tation [https://perma.cc/2UY7-PKA2].
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military and restriction of service members’ access to transition surgery,
reaffirming the Department of Defense’s conclusion in 2016 that permitting
transgender people to serve openly is consistent with military readiness and
strength through diversity.38 In February 2021, Housing and Urban
Development became the first of what no doubt will be many federal
agencies to issue a memorandum notifying grantees and the public that,
consistent with the Bostock opinion, it will administer and enforce federal
sex discrimination statutes to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
transgender status.39
Legal reform at the state and local levels has been equally momentous:
approximately twenty-one states and 330 municipalities prohibit
discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations based
on sexual orientation and gender identity; twenty-four states prohibit health
insurance exclusions for transition-related care; twenty states prohibit
conversion therapy for LGBTQ minors; twenty-seven states prohibit
discrimination in adoption based on sexual orientation and gender identity;
twenty states prohibit school bullying on the bases of sexual orientation and
gender identity; twenty-three states require neither transition surgery nor a
court order to change the gender marker on one’s birth certificate, with
fourteen of these states permitting residents to designate their gender as “X”;
and thirty-eight states do not require proof of transition surgery, a court
order, or an amended birth certificate to change the gender marker on one’s
driver’s license, with twenty of these states permitting residents to designate
their gender as “X.”40

38. Exec. Order No. 14004, 86 Fed. Reg. 7471 (Jan. 25, 2021); see also Executive Order on
Enabling All Qualified Americans to Serve Their Country in Uniform, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 25, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/25/executive-order-on-enablin
g-all-qualified-americans-to-serve-their-country-in-uniform [https://perma.cc/H3DR-L4CV]. In 2017,
the Trump administration halted the use of agency “resources to fund sex reassignment surgical
procedures for military personnel . . . .” Doe v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 184 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting
section 2(b) of Military Service by Transgender Individuals Memorandum, 82 Fed. Reg. 41319 (Aug. 25,
2017)).
39. HUD to Enforce Fair Housing Act to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV. (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.
hud.gov/press/press_releases_media_advisories/HUD_No_21_021 [https://perma.cc/87AF-CQNM].
40. Local Nondiscrimination Ordinances, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, https://www.
lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_ordinances
[https://perma.cc/NKZ4-7K84].
See
generally Snapshot LGBT Equality by State, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, https://www.
lgbtmap.org/equality-maps [https://perma.cc/Q3X7-S53X].
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II. ACCESS TO APPROPRIATE MEDICAL CARE IN PRISON IS
EMBLEMATIC OF THE PROGRESS TRANSGENDER PEOPLE HAVE
MADE
Another important measure of the progress of transgender people can
be found in U.S. prisons, which are disproportionately populated by
transgender people, including transgender people of color who are subjected
to over-policing and often prosecuted for survival crimes.41 Like others in
prison, incarcerated transgender people “are held in conditions that threaten
their health, safety, and human dignity on a daily basis.”42 For transgender
people, these abuses include the denial of access to transition-related medical
care and safe, gender-appropriate housing.43 Although progress in the prison
context has been slow, it has been inexorable, with courts increasingly
recognizing the rights of incarcerated transgender people.44
This Part traces this evolution in the law, from cases requiring that
prison officials provide incarcerated transgender people with access to
hormone therapy and commissary items, to the rejection of policies that
house transgender people based on their birth sex.45 Before discussing this
evolution, some background on gender identity and the treatable medical
41. Transgender Incarcerated People in Crisis, LAMBDA LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.org/
know-your-rights/article/trans-incarcerated-people [https://perma.cc/SAD3-NH6G]; see also Pooja Gehi,
Gendered (In)Security Migration and Criminalization in the Security State, 35 HARV. J. L. & GENDER
357, 367 & n.50 (“[P]ervasive discrimination . . . causes transgender people of color to be more likely to
engage in criminalized work in order to meet their basic needs. These crimes are often poverty-related
‘survival crimes,’ including turnstile jumping, dealing and/or possession of drugs (or prescription
controlled substances), welfare-related crimes, petty theft, . . . loitering,” and “prostitution”).
42. Prisoners’ Rights, AM. C.L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/issues/prisoners-rights [https://per
ma.cc/648D-3Q5F].
43. See infra Part II. For helpful background regarding the challenges that incarcerated transgender
people experience, see generally DAVID B. CRUZ & JILLIAN T. WEISS, GENDER IDENTITY AND THE LAW,
ch. 12 (2021); SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, BEYOND MARRIAGE 59–71 (2017); ALLY WINDSOR HOWELL,
TRANSGENDER PERSONS AND THE LAW, ch. 12 (1st ed. 2013); Broadus & Minter, supra note 32, at 207–
09; Judson Adams, Halle Edwards, Rachel Guy, Maya Springhawk Robnett, Rachel Scholz-Bright &
Breanna Weber, Transgender Rights and Issues, 21 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 479, 515–18 (2020); Yvette K.
W. Bourcicot & Daniel Hirotsu Woofter, Prudent Policy Accommodating Prisoners with Gender
Dysphoria, 12 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 283, 317–19 (2016); Douglas Routh, Gassan Abess, David Makin,
Mary K. Stohr, Craig Hemmens & Jihye Yoo, Transgender Inmates in Prisons A Review of Applicable
Statutes and Policies, 61 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPAR. CRIMINOLOGY 645, 662 (2015);
Classification and Housing of Transgender Inmates in American Prisons, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1746,
1747–50 (2014); AM. C.L. UNION & NAT’L CTR. LESBIAN RTS., KNOW YOUR RIGHTS: LAWS, COURT
DECISIONS, AND ADVOCACY TIPS TO PROTECT TRANSGENDER PRISONERS 4–9 (Dec. 1, 2014) [hereinafter
KNOW YOUR RIGHTS], https://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/KnowYourRights_
GuidetoProtectTransgenderPrisoners.pdf [https://perma.cc/ED59-UWY8]; Sydney Tarzwell, Note, The
Gender Lines Are Marked with Razor Wire Addressing State Prison Policies and Practices for the
Management of Transgender Prisoners, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 167, 190–212 (2006) (compiling
state policies for the management of incarcerated transgender people).
44. See infra Part III.
45. See infra Sections II.B.1–3.
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condition of gender dysphoria is instructive.
A. BACKGROUND: GENDER IDENTITY, GENDER DYSPHORIA, AND
TRANSITION-RELATED CARE
The term “gender identity” is a well-established concept in medicine,
referring to one’s internal sense of their own gender.46 All human beings
develop an understanding of themselves of belonging to a particular gender,
such as male or female, early in life.47 Gender identity is often referred to as
a person’s brain sex.48 This is, in part, because studies focused on
determining the origins of a person’s gender identity have shown that the
human brain is significantly influenced by exposure to hormone levels
before birth.49 Brain studies that correlate brain patterns of transgender
individuals with nontransgender individuals who have the same gender
identity further contribute to the body of research that supports a biological
basis for gender identity.50
At birth, infants are classified as male or female.51 For most people,
46. See Declaration of George Richard Brown, MD, DFAPA in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction ¶ 14, Doe v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 17-cv-1597)
[hereinafter Declaration of George Richard Brown]; see also Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 768
(9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (discussing the meaning of gender identity); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM5] (same).
47. Affidavit of Randi Ettner, Ph.D. ¶ 4, Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding Health
Insurers’ Categorization of Certain Gender Confirming Surgeries as Cosmetic (Conn. Comm’n on Hum.
Rts. & Opportunities Jan. 28, 2020) [hereinafter Affidavit of Randi Ettner].
48. See Declaration of George Richard Brown, supra note 46, ¶¶ 8–9, 15.
49. Id.; see, e.g., CHRISTINE MICHELLE DUFFY, GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 16–77 (2014) (discussing medical studies
pointing to biological etiology for transgender identity); Randi Kaufman, Introduction to Transgender
Identity and Health, in THE FENWAY GUIDE TO LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER HEALTH
331, 337–38 (2d ed. 2008) (“The predominating biological theory suggests that a neurohormonal
disturbance takes place in the brain during embryological development. While the genitalia of the human
embryo become differentiated as male or female during the [twelfth] week of fetal development, the
gender identity portion of the brain differentiates around the [sixteenth] week. If there is a hormonal
imbalance during this four-week period, gender identity may not develop along the same lines as the
genitalia.”); Milton Diamond, Biased-Interaction Theory of Psychosexual Development “How Does One
Know if One Is Male or Female?,” 55 SEX ROLES 589, 597 n.14 (2006) (“During prenatal development
the nervous system, the brain in particular, is programmed along a track that is usually concomitant with
the development of other sex appropriate structures like genitals and reproductive organs. The brain,
however, as in other [i]ntersex conditions, can develop along one sex/gender path while other organs
develop along another. Put simply, the brain can develop as male while other parts of the body develop
as female.”); see also Second Statement of Interest of United States of America at 3–4, Blatt v. Cabela’s
Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75665 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017) (compiling
studies supporting a physical basis for transgender identity); Aruna Saraswat, Jamie D. Weinand & Joshua
D. Safer, Evidence Supporting the Biologic Nature of Gender Identity, 21 ENDOCRINE PRAC. 199, 199–
202 (2015) (providing a review of scientific data and concluding that “current data suggest a biologic
etiology for transgender identity”).
50. Declaration of George Richard Brown, supra note 46, ¶¶ 8–9, 15.
51. Affidavit of Randi Ettner, supra note 47, ¶ 5.
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their gender identity matches the sex they were assigned at birth.52 Generally,
persons born with the typical physical characteristics of males have a male
gender identity, and those with the typical physical characteristics of females
have a female gender identity.53 However, for transgender individuals, this
is not the case. An individual whose gender identity is different from their
assigned birth sex is transgender.54
If unaddressed, the incongruence between a transgender person’s birth
sex and their gender identity results in gender dysphoria, a serious medical
condition.55 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(“DSM”) by the American Psychiatric Association is the generally
recognized authoritative handbook on the diagnosis of mental health
conditions relied upon by mental health professionals in the United States,
Canada, and other countries.56 The content of the DSM reflects a sciencebased, peer-reviewed process by experts in the field.57 According to the fifth
edition of the DSM (“DSM-5”), published in 2013, gender dysphoria is
characterized by the following traits: (1) a marked incongruence between
one’s gender identity and one’s assigned birth sex, which is often
accompanied by a strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and secondary sex
characteristics and/or to acquire primary/secondary sex characteristics of
another gender; and (2) clinically significant and persistent distress resulting
from this incongruence.58 The eleventh revision of the World Health
Organization’s International Classification of Diseases and Related Health
Problems (“ICD”) likewise recognizes the parallel medical condition of
“gender incongruence,” which is characterized “by a marked and persistent
incongruence” between one’s experienced gender and assigned sex, “which
often leads to a desire to ‘transition’, in order to live and be accepted as a
person of the experienced gender, through hormonal treatment, surgery or
other health care services to make the individual’s body align, as much as
desired and to the extent possible, with the experienced gender.”59
People with gender dysphoria may live for a significant period of their
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. ¶ 6; see also Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 768 (9th Cir. 2019) (discussing
transgender identity); DSM-5, supra note 46, at 451 (same).
55. Declaration of George Richard Brown, supra note 46, ¶¶ 17, 37; see also Edmo, 935 F.3d at
768 (discussing gender dysphoria); DSM-5, supra note 46, at 451 (same).
56. See Declaration of George Richard Brown, supra note 46, ¶ 16. See generally WPATH
STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 1–3.
57. See id.
58. DSM-5, supra note 46, at 452–53.
59. HA60 Gender Incongruence of Adolescence or Adulthood, ICD-11 FOR MORTALITY &
MORBIDITY STAT. (May 2021), https://icd.who.int/browse11/l-m/en#/http%3a%2f%2fid.who.int%2ficd
%2fentity%2f90875286 [https://perma.cc/A43C-2XFS].
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lives in denial of the symptoms of gender dysphoria.60 Others may not
initially understand the emotions associated with gender dysphoria or may
lack the language or resources to find support for the distress they experience
until well into adulthood.61 Without treatment, individuals with gender
dysphoria experience a range of debilitating psychological symptoms such
as anxiety, depression, suicidality, and other attendant mental health issues.62
Without support for their transition, they may become socially isolated and
carry a burden of shame and low self-esteem “attributable to the feeling of
being inherently ‘defective.’ ”63 This can lead to stigmatization and, over
time, it can damage the development of a healthy personality and disrupt
social and interpersonal relationships.64
1. WPATH’s Authoritative Standards of Care
While serious and potentially debilitating, gender dysphoria is also
highly treatable.65 The standards of care for treatment of gender dysphoria
are set forth in the World Professional Association for Transgender Health
(“WPATH”) Standards of Care (“WPATH Standards”).66 Developed in the
1970s by pioneering physician Harry Benjamin, the WPATH Standards, now
in their seventh edition, are the internationally recognized guidelines for the
treatment of gender dysphoria.67 The WPATH Standards “articulate a
professional consensus about the psychiatric, psychological, medical, and
surgical management of gender dysphoria” and inform medical treatment in
the United States and throughout the world.68
Every medical professional association to take up the question,

60. Affidavit of Randi Ettner, supra note 47, ¶ 10.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 769 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Left untreated, [gender
dysphoria] . . . can lead to debilitating distress, depression, impairment of function, substance use, selfsurgery to alter one’s genitals or secondary sex characteristics, self-injurious behaviors, and even
suicide.”); DSM-5, supra note 46, at 451 (“[M]any individuals are distressed if the desired physical
interventions by means of hormones and/or surgery are not available.”).
63. Affidavit of Randi Ettner, supra note 47, ¶ 10.
64. Id.
65. Declaration of George Richard Brown, MD, DFAPA in Support of Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction ¶ 39, Doe v. Trump, 275 F. Supp.
3d 167 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 17-cv-1597) [hereinafter Declaration of George Richard Brown Supporting
Opposition] (“Gender dysphoria is a treatable and curable condition.”); see also Edmo, 935 F.3d at 769
(“Gender dysphoria is a serious but treatable medical condition.”).
66. See WPATH Standards, supra note 16.
67. See Declaration of George Richard Brown, supra note 46, ¶ 22; Aaron Devor, History of the
Association, WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, https://www.wpath.org/about/history
[https://perma.cc/8ZR5-B4GS]. The seventh version of the WPATH Standards was published in 2011;
previous versions were published in 2001, 1998, 1990, 1981, 1980, and 1979. See WPATH Standards,
supra note 16, at n.1, 110.
68. Mission and Vision, supra note 85; Affidavit of Randi Ettner, supra note 47, ¶ 11.
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including the American Medical Association, the Endocrine Society, the
American Psychological Association, the American Psychiatric Association,
the World Health Organization, the American Academy of Family
Physicians, the American Public Health Association, the National
Association of Social Workers, the American College of Obstetrics and
Gynecology, and the American Society of Plastic Surgeons, has endorsed
treatment protocols in accordance with the WPATH Standards of Care.69
According to the AMA,
An established body of medical research demonstrates the effectiveness
and medical necessity of mental health care, hormone therapy and
[transition] surgery as forms of therapeutic treatment for many people
diagnosed with [Gender Identity Disorder] . . . . Health experts in [gender
dysphoria], including WPATH, have rejected the myth that such
treatments are “cosmetic” or “experimental” and have recognized that
these treatments can provide safe and effective treatment for a serious
health condition.70

At least four Circuit Courts of Appeals, the U.S. Tax Court, and
numerous federal district courts have likewise concluded that the WPATH
Standards “represent[] the consensus of the medical and mental health
communities regarding the appropriate treatment for transgender and gender
dysphoric individuals.”71 As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Edmo, and as
69. See Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 769 (9th Cir. 2019); see, e.g., AM. MED. ASS’N
HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 122 (A-08) (2008), http://www.imatyfa.org/assets/ama122.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L8RN-ALUW]; Wylie C. Hembree, Peggy Cohen-Kettenis, Henriette A. Delemarrevan de Waal, Louis J. Gooren, Walter J. Meyer III, Norman P. Spack, Vin Tangpricha & Victor M.
Montori, Endocrine Treatment of Transsexual Persons An Endocrine Society Clinical Practice
Guideline, 94 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 3132, 3135 (2009); AM. PSYCH. ASS’N
COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES, TRANSGENDER, GENDER IDENTITY, AND GENDER EXPRESSION NONDISCRIMINATION (2008), https://www.apa.org/about/policy/transgender.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV74JQAG].
70. AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 69, at 1 (footnote omitted). In 2013, the
American Psychiatric Association removed the diagnosis of “gender identity disorder” from the fifth
edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and added a new and distinct
diagnosis: gender dysphoria. See DSM-5, supra note 46, at 451; see also Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr.,
No. 17-12255, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99925, at *16 (D. Mass. June 14, 2018) (expressing agreement
with plaintiff’s argument that “the decision to treat ‘Gender Dysphoria’ in DSM-V as a freestanding
diagnosis is more than a semantic refinement” and that “[r]ather, it reflects an evolving re-evaluation by
the medical community of transgender issues and the recognition that [gender dysphoria] involves far
more than a person’s gender identification”). Like the plaintiff in Doe v. Massachusetts Department of
Correction, who was originally diagnosed with gender identity disorder as a teenager and with gender
dysphoria after 2013, most people diagnosed with gender dysphoria will satisfy the clinical criteria for
gender dysphoria. See id. at *6–8.
71. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 769; see Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 595 (4th Cir.
2020) (“[T]he Standards of Care . . . represent the consensus approach of the medical and mental health
community . . . and have been recognized by various courts, including this one, as the authoritative
standards of care.”); Adams ex rel. Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty., 968 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir.
2020) (stating plaintiff’s medical and social transition as reflecting the “accepted standard of care for
transgender persons suffering from gender dysphoria.”); De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 522–23 (4th
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the state conceded in that case, “the WPATH Standards of Care ‘provide the
best guidance,’ and ‘are the best standards out there.’ ‘There are no other
competing, evidence-based standards that are accepted by any nationally or
internationally recognized medical professional groups.’ ”72
Pursuant to the WPATH Standards, many transgender individuals
undergo a medically-indicated and supervised gender transition, which
allows transgender individuals to live their lives consistent with their gender
identity.73 Because the essence of gender dysphoria is the incongruence of
the body and one’s identity, the goal of gender transition is to enable the
person to comfortably live in their affirmed gender in order to eliminate the
debilitating symptoms of gender dysphoria.74 If this goal is impeded, it will
undermine an individual’s core identity and psychological health.75
The WPATH Standards recommend an individualized approach to
gender transition, consisting of one or more of the following evidence-based
treatment options for gender dysphoria: social transition, hormone therapy,
psychotherapy, and transition surgery.76 Despite incorporation of the word
“social” in its description, social transition is part of the medical course of
gender transition.77 It refers to changes in an individual’s gender expression
and role, which involve living in the gender role consistent with one’s gender
identity.78 Hormone therapy refers to “the administration of exogenous
endocrine agents to induce feminizing or masculinizing changes,” such as a
Cir. 2013) (“The Standards of Care, published by the World Professional Association for Transgender
Health, are the generally accepted protocols for the treatment of [gender dysphoria].”) (footnote
omitted)); Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 553–54 (7th Cir. 2011) (discussing “[t]he accepted standards of
care” for gender dysphoria, including social transition, hormone therapy, and surgery), aff’g, 712 F. Supp.
2d 830, 844 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (“The [WPATH] Standards of Care are ‘a document that articulates
professional consensus about the treatment of gender [dysphoria] . . . .’ ”); O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r,
134 T.C. 34, 65 (2010) (“The [WPATH] standards are widely accepted in the psychiatric profession, as
evidenced by the recognition of the standards’ triadic therapy sequence as the appropriate treatment for
[gender dysphoria] and transsexualism in numerous psychiatric and medical reference texts.”); Monroe
v. Meeks, No. 18-cv-00156, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37128, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2020) (“[T]his Court
finds that the WPATH Standards of Care are an appropriate benchmark for treating gender dysphoria at
this time. . . . Notably, Defendants still have not put forth a single expert to contest the WPATH Standards
of Care or offer an opinion about the appropriate level of care for transgender inmates.”); accord
Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1170 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 802 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir.
2015); Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 231–32 (D. Mass. 2012); Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F.
Supp. 2d 1284, 1289 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 2010), aff’d, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).
72. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 769; see also id. at 791 (discussing “the widely accepted, evidence-based
criteria set out in the WPATH’s Standards of Care”).
73. Affidavit of Randi Ettner, supra note 47, ¶ 12; see WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 9–10.
74. Affidavit of Randi Ettner, supra note 47, ¶ 13.
75. Id.
76. Id. ¶ 12; see WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 9–10.
77. See WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 9–10.
78. Id. See generally Heath Mackenzie Reynolds & Zil Garner Goldstein, Social Transition, in
TRANS BODIES, TRANS SELVES: A RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 124, 124–54 (Laura
Erickson-Schroth ed., 2014) .
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deepened voice, growth in facial and body hair, cessation of menses, physical
alteration to sex-related physiology, and decreased percentage of body fat
compared to muscle mass in transgender men, and alterations to a person’s
genital appearance and functionality, and increased percentage of body fat
compared to muscle mass in transgender women.79 Psychotherapy
(individual, couple, family, or group) “is not intended to alter a person’s
gender identity,” but rather is intended to help people “achieve long-term
comfort in their gender identity expression” by exploring gender identity,
role, and expression; addressing the negative impact of gender dysphoria and
stigma on mental health; alleviating internalized transphobia; enhancing
social and peer support; improving body image; or promoting resilience.80
Lastly, and of most significance to this Article, transition surgery refers
to a range of procedures that change one’s primary and/or secondary sex
characteristics, including surgery on the breasts or chest, external or internal
genitalia, and facial features.81 According to the WPATH Standards,
although many transgender individuals
find comfort with their gender identity, role, and expression without
surgery, for many others surgery is essential and medically necessary to
alleviate their gender dysphoria. . . . For [these individuals], . . . relief from
gender dysphoria cannot be achieved without modification of their primary
and/or secondary sex characteristics to establish greater congruence with
their gender identity. . . . Follow-up studies have shown an undeniable
beneficial effect of [transition surgery] on postoperative outcomes such as
subjective well-being, cosmesis, and sexual function.82
79. WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 33, 36.
80. Id. at 29.
81. Id. at 57.
82. Id. at 54–55 (citing studies). A small handful of controversial figures outside of the
professional medical community, most notably Dr. Paul McHugh, have attempted to cast doubt on the
medical consensus supporting transition surgery. See, e.g., Brief of Dr. Paul R. McHugh, M.D. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 26, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599
(2019) (No. 18-107) (arguing that “[t]here is no good evidence that this dramatic surgery produces the
benefits espoused by the [American Medical Association]”). Dr. McHugh is a member of the American
College of Pediatricians, a “fringe anti-LGBTQ hate group” according to the Southern Poverty Law
Center, and is “well-known for his strongly held view[s] that [transition] surgery is ‘religiously
abhorrent,’ ” a moral “abomination,” and a “collaborat[ion] with madness.” Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F.
Supp. 2d 190, 221 (D. Mass. 2012); American College of Pediatricians, S. POVERTY L. CTR.,
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/american-college-pediatricians [https://per
ma.cc/ZS2N-36WC]; Katherine Pratt, The Tax Definition of “Medical Care ” A Critique of the Startling
IRS Arguments in O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner, 23 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 313, 316–17 (2016). As
advisor to the Vatican, Dr. McHugh urged the Catholic Church to condemn transition surgery as necessary
treatment for gender dysphoria and, as chief of psychiatry at Johns Hopkins Hospital from 1975 to 2001,
McHugh played a central role in ending Johns Hopkins’s first-of-its-kind transgender surgery program in
1979. Amy Ellis Nutt, Long Shadow Cast by Psychiatrist on Transgender Issues Finally Recedes at Johns
Hopkins, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/longshadow-cast-by-psychiatrist-on-transgender-issues-finally-recedes-at-johns-hopkins/2017/04/05/e851e5
6e-0d85-11e7-ab07-07d9f521f6b5_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q5D5-LHEJ]. More recently, Dr.
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Importantly, decades of research have demonstrated that attempting to
treat gender dysphoria by forcing transgender people to live in accordance
with their sex assigned at birth—to “convert” them out of being
transgender—is ineffective, unethical, and dangerous.83 The mainstream
medical community overwhelmingly condemns this “conversion therapy.”84
2. WPATH’s Organization and Drafting Process
Formed in 1979, WPATH is the leading international organization
focused on transgender health care.85 The organization has over two
thousand members throughout the world and is comprised of physicians,
psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, social scientists, and legal
professionals who are dedicated to the treatment of gender dysphoria.86
WPATH’s leadership is composed of renowned health professionals across
the globe, including plastic surgeons, psychologists, psychiatrists, and other
health professionals who have spent years treating people with gender
McHugh has published several articles in non-peer-reviewed religious magazines and journals,
discrediting the efficacy of transition surgery and claiming, contrary to established science, that neither
gender identity nor sexual orientation is biologically determined. See id.; see also O’Donnabhain v.
Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 67 n.47 (2010) (discussing “Surgical Sex” in First Things, a magazine published
by the Institute on Religion and Public Life). Dr. McHugh’s work has been widely denounced by medical
professionals throughout the country—from the National Institutes of Health to dozens of his own
colleagues at Johns Hopkins—who have characterized his claims as “pure balderdash” and “dated, nowdiscredited theories.” Nutt, supra. In 2017, Johns Hopkins reversed the course set by Dr. McHugh four
decades ago by opening a transgender health service and providing needed medical care once again. Id.
83. WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 32 (“Treatment aimed at trying to change a person’s
gender identity and lived gender expression to become more congruent with sex assigned at birth has
been attempted in the past, yet without success, particularly in the long-term. Such treatment is no longer
considered ethical.” (citations omitted)).
84. Id.; see also Letter from U.S. Pro. Ass’n for Transgender Health Bd. of Dirs. to U.S. Surgeon
Gen., Jerome M. Adams 1 & nn.1–4 (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/
USPATH/2019/FINAL%20USPATH%20Letter%20to%20Surgeon%20General%208_26_2019.pdf [htt
ps://perma.cc/A6V9-VBGY] (“It has long been established that psychiatric intervention is likely not
successful, and is instead likely harmful, in the approach to treating youth with gender dysphoria.” (citing
studies)); Conversion “Therapy” Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (July 13, 2021), https://
www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/conversion_therapy [https://perma.cc/CSG8-XMPG] (documenting
twenty states with laws banning conversion therapy for minors). See generally Hearing on Proposed
House Bill 6695 Before the Pub. Health Comm., 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ct. 2017) (statement of
Quinnipiac Univ. Sch. of L. Civil Justice Clinic in support of proposed House Bill 6695), https://www.
cga.ct.gov/2017/PHdata/Tmy/2017HB-06695-R000307-Quinnipiac%20University%20School%20of%
20Law%20Civil%20Justice%20Clinic%20-TMY.PDF [https://perma.cc/TU8H-8QCN] (discussing
harmful consequences of, and medical and legal communities’ opposition to, conversion therapy).
85. See Declaration of George Richard Brown, supra note 46, ¶ 9; see also Mission and Vision,
WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, https://www.wpath.org/about/mission-and-vision
[https://perma.cc/H449-RKHR]. WPATH was originally named the Harry Benjamin International
Gender Dysphoria Association, after one of the first physicians to treat patients with gender dysphoria.
History, WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, https://www.wpath.org/about/history
[https://perma.cc/6E27-HTEU].
86. See Declaration of George Richard Brown, supra note, 46, ¶ 9; Member Search Results,
WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, https://www.wpath.org/member/search/results?
showAll=1 [https://perma.cc/RZR2-MDHL].
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dysphoria.87 Since its founding over forty years ago, WPATH has published
the Standards of Care, which are now in their seventh edition.
Like other professional health organizations, WPATH goes through a
lengthy, rigorous process to generate professional consensus documents that
are relied on by health professionals.88 WPATH’s process for developing
and revising the latest version of the Standards of Care, Version 7, is
illustrative. Although Version 7 was published in 2011, the revision process
began five years earlier, in 2006, with the establishment of a “work group.”89
The work group examined each section of Version 6 of the Standards of
Care, “review[ed] the relevant literature, identif[ied] where research was
lacking and needed, and recommend[ed] potential revisions to the [WPATH
Standards] as warranted by new evidence.”90 Over the next several years,
“invited papers were written, subjected to peer review, and published for
public comment in the International Journal of Transgenderism.”91
In 2010, WPATH’s Board of Directors established a Revision
Committee composed of “a diverse group of dozens of experts and
clinicians,” who debated the background papers.92 The Board then appointed
a subset of that committee, the Writing Group, to draft Version 7 of the
Standards of Care, in consultation with the full Revision Committee and “an
International Advisory Group of transsexual, transgender, and gender87. See Declaration of George Richard Brown, supra note 46, ¶ 9. For example, WPATH Board
member Dr. Randi Ettner, one of the authors of the seventh version of the WPATH Standards and a
licensed clinical and forensic psychologist, has evaluated, diagnosed, and treated over three thousand
individuals with gender dysphoria and mental health issues related to gender variance from 1980 to the
present. Affidavit of Randi Ettner, supra note 47, ¶ 2; see also Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 776
(9th Cir. 2019). Dr. Ettner has also authored or edited numerous peer-reviewed publications on the
treatment of gender dysphoria and transgender health care more broadly, including the leading textbook
used in medical schools on the subject, and she currently trains medical and mental health providers on
treating people with gender dysphoria. See Edmo, 935 F.3d at 775. Similarly, Dr. George Brown, also a
WPATH Board member and co-author of the seventh version of the WPATH Standards, is a licensed
psychiatrist, medical school professor, and chief of psychiatry at James H. Quillen Veterans Affairs
Medical Center in Johnson City, Tennessee. Declaration of George Richard Brown, supra note 46, ¶¶ 2–
3; see also O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 42. Since 1983, Dr. Brown has evaluated and treated between 600
and 1,000 individuals with gender dysphoria in a clinical setting and has reviewed the cases of over 5,100
other individuals with gender dysphoria as an academic researcher. See Declaration of George Richard
Brown, supra note 46, ¶ 5. He has also published numerous papers in peer-reviewed medical journals and
written several book chapters on topics related to gender dysphoria, including those in the Merck
Manuals, one of the most widely used medical reference texts in the world. See O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C.
at 42.
88. See discussion infra Section II.A.2.
89. WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 109.
90. Id.
91. Brief for the World Pro. Ass’n for Transgender Health as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
at 7, Kosilek v. O’Brien, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1120) [hereinafter WPATH Amicus Brief];
see WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 109.
92. WPATH Amicus Brief, supra note 91, at 7; see WPATH Standards of Care, supra note 16, at
109.
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nonconforming individuals” who “g[a]ve input on the revision.”93 At a twoday, face-to-face meeting, the Writing Group “reviewed all recommended
changes and debated and came to consensus on various controversial
areas.”94 Decisions were made “based on the best available science and
expert consensus,” and were incorporated into the draft of Version 7, which
was circulated among the broader Revision Committee and the International
Advisory Group for comment.95 After three iterations of review and revision,
the Writing Group presented the final draft of Version 7 to the WPATH
Board of Directors, which approved the WPATH Standards on September
14, 2011.96
WPATH’s comprehensive process for drafting the WPATH Standards
is consistent with that of other professional organizations whose
authoritative consensus documents are routinely relied upon by courts and
agencies.97 The American Psychiatric Association, for example, publishes
and periodically updates its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (“DSM”), now in its fifth edition.98 Similar to the Standards of
Care, the “development and revision process for the Fifth Edition of the
DSM spanned fourteen years and involved multiple phases including
extensive research and literature review, field trials, data analysis, and
drafting among work groups in consultation with leadership.”99 Courts have
widely credited the DSM as “the diagnostic Bible of mental disorders,” as
have agencies.100 Similarly, the World Health Organization publishes and
periodically updates the ICD, which is widely relied upon by both courts and
U.S. public health officials at the federal, state, and local levels.101 The
93. WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 110.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 786 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Accepted standards of care and
practice within the medical community are highly relevant in determining what care is medically
acceptable and unacceptable.”).
98. See DSM-5, supra note 46.
99. WPATH Amicus Brief, supra note 91, at 8.
100. Lee v. Barnhart, 117 F. App’x 674, 678 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished); see, e.g., Hall v.
Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014) (stating that the DSM is “one of the basic texts used by psychiatrists
and other experts . . . .”); United States v. Wooden, 693 F.3d 440, 452 n.4 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The DSM is
widely recognized as ‘the authoritative reference used in diagnosing mental disorders.’ ” (quoting Young
v. Murphy, 615 F.3d 59, 61 n.1 (1st Cir. 2010))); Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Mental
Disorders Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 66138, 66160–78 (Sept. 26, 2016) (relying on the DSM-5 to evaluate claims
involving mental disorders under the Social Security Act); Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/adhd/diagnosis.
html [https://perma.cc/9FVP-N3C6] (referencing the DSM-5 in the Centers for Disease Control’s
(“CDC”) explanation of ADHD diagnosis).
101. See, e.g., Madej v. Maiden, 951 F.3d 364, 375 (6th Cir. 2020) (affirming the district court’s
exclusion of expert testimony regarding multiple-chemical-sensitivity diagnosis, in part, because “the
diagnosis remains unrecognized by the American Medical Association and unlisted in the World Health
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development and revision process for the current version of the ICD, now in
its eleventh edition, spanned over ten years and involved a systematic review
of the available scientific literature and relevant information on health
policies and health professionals’ experience with the ICD-10, as well as
field-testing and extensive drafting among working groups.102
3. The WPATH Standards’ Application to Correctional Facilities
Importantly, the WPATH Standards explicitly apply “in their
entirety . . . to all transsexual, transgender, and gender nonconforming
people, irrespective of their housing situation.”103 This includes transgender
people who are incarcerated. According to the WPATH Standards, “[p]eople
should not be discriminated against in their access to appropriate health care
based on where they live, including institutional environments such as
prisons,” and such healthcare “should mirror that which would be available
to them if they were living in a non-institutional setting within the same
community. . . . All elements of assessment and treatment as described in the
[WPATH Standards] can be provided to people living in institutions.”104
Notably, both the U.S. Department of Justice National Institute of
Corrections and the National Commission on Correctional Health Care, “a
leading professional organization in health care delivery in the correctional
context,” whose standards are widely relied upon by courts, have endorsed
the WPATH Standards.105
Organization’s International Classification of Diseases”); Granville House, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health &
Hum. Servs., 715 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th Cir. 1983) (“[C]ounsel for the [U.S.] government stated that the
ICD was widely used throughout [the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services] as a reference
manual for disease classification purposes . . . .”); International Classification of Diseases, (ICD10CM/PCS) Transition—Background, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.
cdc.gov/nchs/icd/icd10cm_pcs_background.htm [https://perma.cc/768B-AZ2Y] (relying on ICD for
purposes of compliance with HIPAA).
102. WORLD HEALTH ORG., PRODUCTION OF ICD-11: THE OVERALL REVISION PROCESS 2 (2007),
https://www.who.int/classifications/icd/ICDRevision.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PMV-URFT].
103. WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 67; see also Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 789
(9th Cir. 2019).
104. WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 67; see also id. (“Access to these medically necessary
treatments should not be denied on the basis of institutionalization or housing arrangements”); Edmo, 935
F.3d at 771 (“The next update to the WPATH Standards of Care will likewise apply equally to
incarcerated persons.”).
105. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 771 (discussing the National Commission on Correctional Healthcare);
BRENDA V. SMITH & JAIME M. YARUSSI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NAT’L INST. OF CORR., POLICY REVIEW
AND DEVELOPMENT GUIDE: LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND INTERSEX PERSONS IN
CUSTODIAL SETTINGS nn.30–38 (2d ed. 2015), https://info.nicic.gov/sites/info.nicic.gov.lgbti/files/lgbtipolicy-review-guide-2_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CPV-HZTY] (discussing WPATH’s “internationally
accepted protocols for the treatment of youth and adults with gender dysphoria”); Transgender and
Gender Diverse Health Care in Correctional Settings, NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE (Nov.
1, 2020), https://www.ncchc.org/transgender-and-gender-diverse-health-care [https://perma.cc/AN2YZ892] (endorsing WPATH Standards to guide correctional health professionals in addressing the needs
of transgender people); see also Grochowski v. Clayton Cnty., 961 F.3d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 2020)

128

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:109 !

B. ACCESS TO TRANSITION-RELATED CARE IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
Before discussing the progress of incarcerated transgender people in
securing medically necessary care and appropriate housing, a summary of
the Eighth Amendment analysis is instructive.
1. The Eighth Amendment Analysis
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.”106
This prohibition encompasses both “deliberate indifference to [the] serious
medical needs” of incarcerated people, that is, the failure to provide adequate
medical care, as well as “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious harm” to incarcerated people, that is, the failure to protect
incarcerated people from violence at the hands of other inmates.107
i. Inadequate Medical Care
As Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the majority, stated over
forty years ago in Estelle v. Gamble, “broad and idealistic concepts of
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency” embodied in the Eighth
Amendment “establish the government’s obligation to provide medical
care . . . . for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of [their]
liberty, care for [themselves].”108 To establish a claim of inadequate medical
care under the Eighth Amendment, an incarcerated person must make two
showings. First, the person must show a “serious medical need.”109 For those
with gender dysphoria, this is not a difficult showing. State departments of
corrections regularly concede that “gender dysphoria is a sufficiently serious
medical need to trigger the State’s obligations under the Eighth

(discussing the “best practices issued by the National Commission on Correctional Healthcare”);
Schuenemann v. United States, No. 05-2565, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 4350, at *14 (3d Cir. Feb. 23, 2006)
(discussing “the standards set forth by the National Commission on Correctional Healthcare . . . the
national governing body responsible for overseeing the delivery of prison health care . . . .”); accord
Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 336–42 (5th Cir. 2004); Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v.
District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
107. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835–36 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
For helpful discussions of Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care and failure-to-protect claims
brought by incarcerated transgender people, see CRUZ & WEISS, supra note 43, at 669–819; MEZEY, supra
note 43, at 59–71, and KNOW YOUR RIGHTS, supra note 43.
108. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102–04 (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926)); see also id. at 103 (“An inmate must rely on prison
authorities to treat [their] medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met. In
the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce physical ‘torture or a lingering death,’ . . . the evils
of most immediate concern to the drafters of the [Eighth] Amendment. In less serious cases, denial of
medical care may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological
purpose.” (citations omitted)).
109. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 785 (9th Cir. 2019).
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Amendment.”110
Second, the person must show that the prison officials’ response to the
need was deliberately indifferent.111 When an incarcerated person seeks
treatment for gender dysphoria, this step of the analysis is where the battle
lines are drawn. The analysis has two components: (1) the course of
treatment that officials chose was medically unacceptable under the
circumstances—that is, they denied well-established care, such as hormone
therapy, social transition, or surgery; and (2) the official chose the medically
unacceptable course of treatment in conscious disregard of an excessive risk
to the plaintiff’s health.112
ii. Failure to Protect
The Supreme Court formally recognized the Eighth Amendment’s
failure-to-protect theory in 1994 in Farmer v. Brennan, a case in which an
incarcerated transgender woman, Dee Farmer, was beaten and brutally raped
by her male cellmate.113 According to the Supreme Court,
[P]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the
hands of other prisoners. . . . [G]ratuitously allowing the beating or rape
of one prisoner by another serves no “legitimate penological
objectiv[e],” . . . any more than it squares with “evolving standards of
decency.” Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not “part of the
penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”114

To succeed on a failure-to-protect claim, an incarcerated person must
show that they are “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk
of serious harm” and that prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference”
to their safety.115
110. Id. (stating that the State did not contest that gender dysphoria was a serious medical need,
“[n]or could it”); see, e.g., Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Here, the State of Texas
does not appear to contest that Gibson has a serious medical need, in light of [her] record of psychological
distress, suicidal ideation, and threats of self-harm.”); Lamb v. Norwood, 899 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir.
2018) (“The seriousness of Michelle’s medical need is uncontested for purposes of summary judgment.”);
see also O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 62 (2010) (collecting circuit cases finding “serious
medical need”).
111. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 786.
112. Id.; see also Lemire v. Cal Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab, 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013)
(stating that incarcerated person “must show that prison officials ‘kn[e]w[] of and disregard[ed]’ the
substantial risk of harm, but the officials need not have intended any harm to befall the inmate; ‘it is
enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm’ ”
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994)).
113. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829–30.
114. Id. at 833–34 (citations omitted) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 478 U.S. 517, 548 (1984); Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
115. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also id. at 837, 842 (stating that a prison official is deliberately
indifferent when they “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety,” and that
“a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk
was obvious”).
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2. Access to Hormone Therapy
According to the WPATH Standards, feminizing and masculinizing
hormone therapy is a medically necessary treatment for gender dysphoria,
“induc[ing] physical changes that are more congruent with a patient’s gender
identity.”116 Historically, some state departments of corrections refused to
provide incarcerated transgender people with hormone therapy. They did so
in two primary ways: through general policies that categorically banned
hormone therapy or prohibited such therapy for those who were not receiving
it prior to incarceration; and through individualized assessments conducted
by treating physicians who asserted, erroneously, that hormone therapy was
not safe or effective.117 Over the past two decades, the tide has shifted.
Numerous courts have concluded that categorical bans on hormone
therapy, and so-called “freeze-frame” policies that prohibit hormone therapy
for those who were not receiving it prior to incarceration, violate the Eighth
Amendment because such policies are deliberately indifferent to the
individual medical needs of incarcerated people.118 In 2001, in Allard v.
Gomez, for example, the Ninth Circuit reversed a grant of summary
judgment to the California Department of Corrections for refusing to provide
hormone therapy to an incarcerated transgender woman on the basis of a
“department-wide policy . . . that denied such therapy for gender
[dysphoria], regardless of the medical recommendations for treatment of any
given individual.”119 In 2011, when state legislators in Wisconsin enacted
legislation that categorically banned hormone therapy (and transition
surgery) for incarcerated people—without an exception for medical
necessity—the Seventh Circuit held that the statute violated the Eighth
Amendment on its face and as applied to the plaintiffs who had been
receiving such therapy.120 “Just as the legislature cannot outlaw all effective
cancer treatments for prison inmates,” the Seventh Circuit stated, “it cannot
outlaw the only effective treatment for a serious condition like [gender
dysphoria].”121 In 2013, in De’lonta v. Johnson, the Fourth Circuit held that
116. WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 36; see also id. at 36–38 (discussing physical effects of
masculinizing and feminizing hormones); see also O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 70, 71 (concluding, inter
alia, that hormone therapy “treat[s] disease” and is not “a cosmetic procedure[]”).
117. See KNOW YOUR RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 6–7; see also infra Section II.B.
118. See infra Section II.B.2.
119. Allard v. Gomez, 9 F. App’x 793, 794 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished); see also South v. Gomez,
No. 99-15976, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3200, at *5–6 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 2000) (holding that prison officials
violate Eighth Amendment by abruptly terminating an incarcerated transgender person’s hormone
therapy).
120. Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011).
121. Id. at 557; see also Diamond v. Owens, 131 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1373–74 (M.D. Ga. 2015)
(holding, inter alia, that plaintiff stated a claim that the State’s blanket denial of hormone therapy violated
the Eighth Amendment); Barrett v. Coplan, 292 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285–86 (D.N.H. 2003) (holding that
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the plaintiff, an incarcerated transgender woman, stated a claim that the state
department of corrections violated the Eighth Amendment by terminating
her hormone therapy pursuant to a blanket ban on such therapy.122 And in
2018, in Hicklin v. Precynthe, a federal district court in Missouri invalidated
a state department of corrections freeze-frame policy and directed the state
to provide the plaintiff medically necessary care, including hormone
therapy.123
This shift away from policies that exclude hormone therapy is
consistent with the current position of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. In
response to litigation brought by a transgender woman incarcerated in
federal prison,124 the Bureau, in 2011, agreed to eliminate its freeze-frame
policy that permitted incarcerated individuals with gender dysphoria “to
receive only the level of treatment they received in the community prior to
incarceration.”125 The current policy, Federal Bureau of Prisons Program
Statement 6031.04, “[r]ecognizes the need to treat prisoners according to
their needs, rather than blanket rigid policies,” by requiring that people in
Bureau custody with a possible diagnosis of gender dysphoria “receive a
plaintiff stated a claim that the State’s “blanket policy . . . of not considering hormone or surgical
treatment for people with [gender dysphoria], without regard to the individualized medical need presented
by the individual patient suffering from the condition, prevented her from being considered for
appropriate treatment for her serious medical needs” in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Brooks v.
Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying summary judgment to the State for denying
hormone therapy to incarcerated transgender woman on the basis of freeze-frame policy, and stating that
“[p]rison officials cannot deny [transgender] inmates all medical treatment simply by referring to a prison
policy which makes a seemingly arbitrary distinction between inmates who were and were not diagnosed
with [gender dysphoria] prior to incarceration”), vacated in part on other grounds, 289 F. Supp. 2d 286
(N.D.N.Y. 2003); cf. Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020)
(stating that, during litigation, the State “formally rescinded its freeze-frame policy”—“pursuant to which
it refused [plaintiff’s] early requests for hormone treatment”—and “replaced it with a new one that
properly attends to inmates’ individualized medical needs”); Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228,
251 (D. Mass. 2012) (denying summary judgment to the State for refusing to provide, inter alia, transition
surgery to incarcerated transgender woman on the basis of blanket ban that “determine[d], without
exception, that certain accepted treatments for [gender dysphoria] are never medically necessary for
inmates”).
122. De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525–26 (4th Cir. 2013).
123. Hicklin v. Precynthe, No. 4:16–cv–01357, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21516, at *49–50 (E.D. Mo.
Feb. 9, 2018); see also Lynch v. Lewis, No. 7:14-CV-24, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62885, at *1–2 (M.D.
Ga. May 7, 2014) (holding that plaintiff stated a plausible claim that the denial of hormone therapy
pursuant to freeze-frame policy violated the Eighth Amendment); Houston v. Trella, No. 04-CV-1393,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68484, at *17–18 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 2006) (denying summary judgment to the
State and holding that a categorical denial of hormone treatment violated the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments); cf. Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1068–70 (9th Cir. 2014) (denying summary
judgment to the State and holding that a blanket policy of denying cataract surgery in which a person has
at least one “good eye” violated Eighth Amendment); Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 166–67 (2d Cir.
2003) (denying summary judgment to the State and holding that a blanket policy of denying treatment of
keloid scars to alleviate moderate chronic pain violates Eight Amendment).
124. See Adams v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 716 F. Supp. 2d 107, 110 (D. Mass. 2010).
125. Statement of Interest of United States at 17 n.29, Diamond v. Owens, 131 F. Supp. 3d 1346
(M.D. Ga. 2015) (No. 5:15-cv-50).
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current individualized assessment and evaluation.”126 According to the
policy, treatment options, “including, but not limited to: those elements of
the real life experience consistent with the prison environment, hormone
therapy, and counseling[,] . . . will not be precluded solely due to level of
services received, or lack of services, prior to incarceration.”127 Likewise,
numerous states have administrative policies explicitly requiring that
incarcerated transgender people receive hormone therapy and other
medically necessary transition-related care.128
In addition to invalidating blanket bans and freeze-frame policies for
hormone therapy, courts have also rejected the outdated assumptions of some
medical professionals that hormone therapy was “danger[ou]s,”
“controversial,” and not medically necessary.129 As the science surrounding
the treatment of gender dysphoria has progressed, recent cases reiterate the
consensus position of the medical community that hormone therapy is safe,
effective, and medically necessary for the treatment of gender dysphoria.130
126. Id. at 17; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT NO. 6031.04:
PATIENT CARE 41–42 (June 3, 2014) [hereinafter TRANSGENDER PATIENT CARE].
127. TRANSGENDER PATIENT CARE, supra note 126, at 41–42; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FED.
BUREAU OF PRISONS, CHANGE NOTICE, NO. 5200.04 CN-1: TRANSGENDER OFFENDER MANUAL 9 (May
11, 2018) [hereinafter TRANSGENDER OFFENDER MANUAL] (requiring that incarcerated transgender
people receive “hormone or other necessary treatment”).
128. See, e.g., R.I. DEP’T OF CORR., STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE: IDENTIFICATION,
TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX INMATES 11 (2018) (“Hormone
Treatment and Sexual Reassignment Surgery . . . Transgender inmates will receive all medical care,
treatment and the maintenance of any ongoing procedures related to the transition process utilizing the
standards of care afforded to all [Rhode Island Department of Corrections] inmates. . . .”); MASS. DEP’T
OF CORR., IDENTIFICATION, TREATMENT AND CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT OF INMATES DIAGNOSED
WITH GENDER DYSPHORIA 10 (2017) (providing that people with gender dysphoria receive medical care,
including hormone therapy, “utilizing the most current version of the standards of care referenced by
WPATH”); see also Douglas Rourth et al., supra note 43, at 18.
129. E.g., Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 960, 963 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that refusal to provide
hormone therapy did not violate Eighth Amendment based, in part, on “the medical
community[’s] . . . disagree[ment] among themselves as to the best form of treatment for plaintiff’s
condition,” including treating physicians’ assertions that such therapy was “controversial” and
“danger[ou]s”); accord Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Praylor v. Tex.
Dept. of Crim. Just., 430 F.3d 1208, 1209 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation for
refusal to provide hormone therapy based, in part, on “the lack of medical necessity for the hormone”).
In a separate line of cases, courts have consistently found no Eighth Amendment violation for the failure
to provide hormone therapy where there was no underlying diagnosis of gender dysphoria. See Smith v.
Hayman, 489 F. App’x 544, 547 (3d Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (no “definitive [gender dysphoria]
diagnosis”); Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The psychiatrist does not believe that
[plaintiff] suffers from gender dysphoria.”); Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The experts
thus agreed that [plaintiff] is not a transsexual” and is not “eligible for hormone therapy or sex-change
surgery”); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 328 (8th Cir. 1988) (“[H]ere there is a question as to whether
[plaintiff] is a transsexual and whether any treatment is required.”).
130. See, e.g., Kothmann v. Rosario, 558 F. App’x 907, 911 (11th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (“[W]e
hold that [the plaintiff] has alleged facts sufficient to show that [prison officials] knew that hormone
treatment was the recognized, accepted, and medically necessary treatment for [plaintiff’s gender
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3. Facilitation of Social Transition
According to the WPATH Standards, social transition—that is,
changing one’s “gender expression and role . . . which may involve living
part time or full time in another gender role, consistent with one’s gender
identity”—is a medically necessary treatment for gender dysphoria.131 Social
transition often includes “wearing clothing and having a hairstyle that
reflects [one’s] gender identity,” as well as gender-affirming procedures
such as “[h]air removal through electrolysis, laser treatment, or waxing.”132
Although clothing, makeup, and hair removal items “may appear superficial
or not medical,” they “in fact play a prominent role in the treatment of
[gender dysphoria] and allow the patient to move from a discordant and
uncomfortable life that interferes with their functioning into a safer and more
comfortable gendered ecology.”133 Social transition also includes using and
being referred to by names and pronouns congruent with one’s gender
identity and, in the prison context, having access to gender-appropriate strip
searches and housing.134 Along with state statutes and administrative policies
dysphoria], yet knowingly refused [plaintiff’s] repeated requests for such treatment and thus was
deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need.”); Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 555–56 (7th Cir.
2011) (characterizing as dicta statements in decades-old cases that suggested that hormone therapy was
an “esoteric,” medically unnecessary treatment and concluding that the defendant “did not produce any
evidence that another treatment could be an adequate replacement for hormone therapy. Plaintiffs’
witnesses repeatedly made the point that, for certain patients with [gender dysphoria], hormone therapy
is the only treatment that reduces dysphoria and can prevent the severe emotional and physical harms
associated with it.”) (citing Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1997) and Meriwether v. Faulkner,
821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987))); Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 452, 455 (1st Cir. 2011) (affirming a
preliminary injunction ordering prison officials to provide hormone therapy to incarcerated transgender
person where officials “concede[d] that [the plaintiff] suffer[ed] from [gender dysphoria] and need[ed]
treatment and that hormone therapy ha[d] been recommended as medically necessary,” and engaged in
“delays, poor explanations, missteps, changes in position and rigidities . . . to an extreme”); see also
Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corrs. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[The State’s] own doctors
have concluded—and testified under oath—that [plaintiff’s] hormone therapy is medically necessary.”);
Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 501–02 (7th Cir. 2018) (denying summary judgment to the State based
on “material disputes about whether [prison officials] balanced the pros and cons of starting [plaintiff] on
hormones, or if they just looked at the calendar and reflexively dismissed her request.”); Phillips v. Mich.
Dep’t of Corrs., 731 F. Supp. 792, 800 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (holding that prison officials’ termination of
hormone therapy to incarcerated transgender woman deprived her of “healing medical treatment” in
violation of the Eighth Amendment), aff’d, No. 90-1289, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10204 (6th Cir. 1991).
131. WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 9–10.
132. Id. at 10, 16.
133. Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874, 910 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (quoting plaintiff’s expert, Dr.
Randi Ettner); see also id. at 890 (“[The WPATH Standards] do[] not specify a list of particular
ingredients that will create the image that [a person with gender dysphoria] needs to establish a level of
well-being. [They do], however, provide a guideline, and in that guideline, the thrust of it is to
help . . . people [with gender dysphoria] consolidate an identity that is ego-syntonic and causes them to
feel comfortable and safe in this world, therefore, the real-life experience, so they get practice in living
24 hours a day, seven days a week in their preferred gender.” (quoting Dr. Ettner)).
134. WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 9–10, 32, 67 (stating that health care for incarcerated
transgender people “should mirror that which would be available to them if they were living in a noninstitutional setting,” and discussing gender-appropriate pronoun usage and gender-segregated
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requiring prison officials’ facilitation of social transition,135 Eighth
Amendment litigation has been critical to removing barriers to social
transition in prison.
i. Access to Commissary Items and Other Gender-Affirming Care
Some state departments of corrections have prevented incarcerated
transgender people from socially transitioning by prohibiting them from
purchasing gender-affirming clothing from the prison commissary and
refusing to provide gender-affirming procedures such as hair removal.136
When incarcerated transgender people have challenged these denials, courts
have in almost all cases ruled in their favor.137
As the district court concluded in Hicklin v. Precynthe, “the case law is
clear—‘gender-affirming’ canteen items,” such as clothing and makeup,
“and permanent hair removal are not merely cosmetic treatments but,
instead, medically necessary treatments to address a serious medical
disease.”138 In Hicklin, the district court granted a preliminary injunction
directing prison officials to provide the plaintiff, an incarcerated transgender
woman, “with care that her doctors deem to be medically necessary treatment
for her gender dysphoria,” including, inter alia, “access to permanent body
hair removal, and access to ‘gender-affirming’ canteen items.”139 Likewise,
in Monroe v. Baldwin, a class action brought by six incarcerated transgender
women, the district court concluded that “[s]ocial transition is ‘an important
component of medical treatment,’ ”140 and held that there was evidence that
prison officials “prevent[ed] Plaintiffs’ social transitions” in violation of the
Eighth Amendment by, inter alia, “denying them access to female

correctional facilities); see also Monroe v. Baldwin, 424 F. Supp. 3d 526, 547 (S.D. Ill. 2019) (ordering
the State to “develop a policy to allow transgender inmates medically necessary social transition,
including individualized placement determinations, avoidance of cross-gender strip searches, and access
to gender-affirming clothing and grooming items”); Affidavit of Randi Ettner, Ph.D., ¶ 35, Doe v. Mass.
Dep’t of Corr., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112313 (D. Mass. July 8, 2019) (No. 17-12255) (“Being referred
to by the appropriate female name and being respectfully treated as a woman are crucial to the
psychological well-being of a gender dysphoric woman. Absent respectful and appropriate interactions,
psychological symptoms and disorders develop. . . . It is extremely distressing for a transgender woman
to be . . . strip-searched by male guards who touch and grope her.”).
135. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 32A (West 2018) (requiring that incarcerated
people be addressed by staff in a manner consistent with their gender identity, have access to items,
clothing, and educational materials consistent with their gender identity, and have the right to be searched
by a staff member of the same gender identity); accord CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-81ii (West 2020);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 2606 (West Supp. 2022); R.I. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 128, at 5, 12.
136. See KNOW YOUR RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 7; see also infra Part III.
137. See infra Part III.
138. Hicklin v. Precynthe, No. 4:16-CV-01357, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21516, at *43 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 9,
2018).
139. Id. at *48.
140. Monroe v. Baldwin, 424 F. Supp. 3d 526, 545 (S.D. Ill. 2019).
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commissary items.”141 The court granted a preliminary injunction ordering
prison officials to “develop a policy to allow transgender inmates medically
necessary social transition, including . . . access to gender-affirming clothing
and grooming items.”142 In Soneeya, the district court similarly enjoined a
state department of corrections from enforcing a policy that categorically
prohibited, inter alia, “[f]eminization or masculinization procedures such as
laser hair removal and/or electrolysis for permanent facial, chest or other
body hair removal.”143 And in Konitzer v. Frank, the district court denied
summary judgement to a state department of corrections and held that the
plaintiff, an incarcerated transgender woman, had provided sufficient
evidence to show that prison officials’ blanket ban of “modest makeup,
female undergarments, [and] facial hair remover or growth items” denied her
medically necessary care in violation of the Eighth Amendment.144
ii. Gender-Appropriate Strip Searches and Pronoun Usage
Prison officials have also undermined transgender people’s social
transition by denying them access to gender-appropriate strip searches and
misgendering them in violation of the Eighth Amendment.145 The law is
clear that, absent emergency circumstances, “cross-gender” strip-searches
involving intimate physical contact violate the Eighth Amendment.146 This
141. Id. at 527, 545.
142. Id. at 547.
143. Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 240 (D. Mass. 2012).
144. Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874, 909 (E.D. Wis. 2010); see also Iglesias v. True, 403
F. Supp. 3d 680, 685 (S.D. Ill. 2019) (holding that an incarcerated transgender woman made out a
plausible claim that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by denying her medically necessary
care for gender dysphoria, including laser hair removal); Diamond v. Owens, 131 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1360,
1364 (M.D. Ga. 2015) (holding that plaintiff, a transgender woman, stated a claim that prison officials
denied her medically necessary treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment by ridiculing and
disciplining her “for her female gender expression,” including her feminine “eyebrow adornments”);
Alexander v. Weiner, 841 F. Supp. 2d 486, 492 (D. Mass. 2012) (holding that plaintiff stated a claim that
prison officials denied her medically necessary care in violation of Eighth Amendment by repeatedly
ignoring her doctors’ prescriptions for “laser hair removal and/or electrolysis”). But compare Keohane v.
Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1274 (11th Cir. 2020) (vacating the district court’s order
directing prison officials to permit plaintiff to socially transition and holding that prison officials’ denial
of access to female clothing and grooming standards did not violate Eighth Amendment because, “unlike
with respect to hormone therapy, the testifying medical professionals were—and remain—divided over
whether social transitioning is medically necessary to Keohane’s gender-dysphoria treatment”), with id.
at 1295–97 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the district court correctly found that prison officials had
a “categorical, blanket ban” on social transitioning, and that the State’s medical providers who determined
that social transitioning was not medically necessary for plaintiff “were incompetent and incredible”).
145. See KNOW YOUR RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 7, 12.
146. See Shaw v. District of Columbia, 944 F. Supp. 2d 43, 56, 58–59 (D.D.C. 2013) (stating that
“a reasonable officer would know that treating a female detainee as plaintiff was treated,” including
having her searched by male prison officials, “exposed her to a substantial risk of serious harm, and,
therefore, would know that those actions violated her constitutional rights”); id. at 57 (applying Eighth
Amendment analysis to search of a pretrial detainee, given that “the due process rights of a pretrial
detainee are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner”
(quoting Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983))). In addition to the Fifth and Eighth
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prohibition applies to male prison officials’ strip-searches of transgender
women.147 As the district court stated in Shaw v. District of Columbia, a
transgender woman’s “ ‘clearly established rights’ include the same rights as
any other female detainee.”148 Additionally, courts have required prison
officials to address misgendering by training prison officials regarding
proper name and pronoun usage.149
In Monroe, for example, the district court concluded that there was
evidence that prison officials “prevent[ed] Plaintiffs’ social transitions” by,
inter alia, conducting cross-gender strip searches and also “misgendering
inmates,” which, the court stated is “traumatic” for a person with gender
dysphoria.150
The court granted a preliminary injunction ordering prison officials
to immediately . . . develop a policy to allow transgender inmates medically
necessary social transition, including . . . avoidance of cross-gender strip
searches, and . . . advis[ing] the Court what steps, if any, [prison officials have]
taken to train all correctional staff on transgender issues, including the harms
Amendments, cross-gender strip searches may violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., id. at 58 (holding
that transgender woman who was detained pretrial stated a claim that prison officials violated her clearly
established Fourth Amendment rights not to be searched by male prison staff); Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1146 (9th Cir. 2011) (“This litany of cases over the last thirty years has
a recurring theme: cross-gender strip searches in the absence of an emergency violate an inmate’s right
under the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable searches.”).
147. See, e.g., Monroe v. Baldwin, 424 F. Supp. 3d 526, 547 (S.D. Ill. 2019) (ordering prison
officials to avoid cross-gender strip searches of incarcerated transgender people); Shadle v. Frakes, No.
8:16CV546, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53731, at *2–3 (D. Neb. Apr. 7, 2017) (permitting incarcerated
transgender woman to sue prison officials for, inter alia, subjecting her to male staff strip-searches); Shaw,
944 F. Supp. 2d at 57, 60 (holding that transgender woman who was detained pretrial stated a claim that
prison officials violated her clearly established due process rights under the Fifth Amendment not to be
searched by male prison staff); see also Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 418 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that forcing transgender people to regularly “strip before guards and other inmates” may violate
the Eighth Amendment where it is “maliciously motivated, unrelated to institutional security, and hence
‘totally without penological justification’ ” (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981))); cf.
Sarratt v. Stirling, No. 8:16-cv-03486, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63399, at *3, 7 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2019)
(denying injunctive relief to an incarcerated transgender woman who was “subjected to body cavity
searches by male corrections officers” based on testimony from prison warden that, in response to
litigation, he “directed that female staff members perform patdown searches of Plaintiff unless there is
some type of emergent situation where a female officer is not available and [a] search has to be done
immediately”). But see Naisha v. Metzger, 490 F. Supp. 3d. 796, 804 (D. Del. 2020) (stating that “there
is no precedent to support the existence of [a] right” for “a transgender inmate to be strip searched by an
officer of the gender with which the inmate identifies”).
148. Shaw, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 58.
149. See, e.g., Monroe, 424 F. Supp. 3d at 547 (granting an preliminary injunction ordering State to
advise the court regarding training of prison staff on transgender issues); Hampton v. Baldwin, No. 3:18CV-550, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190682, at *52 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2018) (granting an preliminary
injunction ordering prison officials to “train all correctional staff on transgender issues”); cf. Tay v.
Dennison, 457 F. Supp. 3d 657, 683–84, 690–91 (S.D. Ill. 2020) (holding that incarcerated transgender
woman demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her equal protection claim with regard to,
inter alia, “constant[] misgender[ing]”).
150. Monroe, 424 F. Supp. 3d at 545.
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caused by misgendering and harassment—by both [prison] staff and other
inmates.151

iii. Access to Appropriate Placement
Incarcerating transgender women in men’s prisons and transgender men
in women’s prisons undermines the process of social transition and also
poses obvious and horrifying risks to transgender people’s health and safety,
including sexual assault and violence.152 In recognition of these substantial
risks to transgender people’s health and safety, the WPATH Standards
caution against housing transgender people “on the sole basis of the
appearance of the external genitalia,” and state that housing assignments for
incarcerated transgender people should instead “take into account their
gender identity and role, physical status, dignity, and personal safety.”153
Despite these obvious risks and the consensus position of the medical
community, prisons officials have historically denied incarcerated
transgender people access to gender-appropriate placement—instead
housing them according to their assigned sex at birth, or placing them in
administrative segregation, that is, solitary confinement.154 As the result of
151. Id. at 546–47.
152. See, e.g., Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 417 (“Given her transsexual identity and unique physical
characteristics, her being housed among male inmates in a general population cell would undoubtedly
create, in the words of the district court, ‘a volatile and explosive situation.’ Under such circumstances it
is unlikely that prison officials would be able to protect her from the violence, sexual assault, and
harassment about which she complains.” (quoting the district court)); see also 42 U.S.C § 30301(12)
(acknowledging the “epidemic character of prison rape and the day-to-day horror experienced by
victimized inmates”); see also Darren Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Transgendered Prisoners Caught
in the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 523–24 (2000) (stating that “[m]ale prisons have
an infamous history of creating and reinforcing barbarous hierarchies of economic, social, and sexual
subjugation of the weak to the strong, hierarchies that affect and victimize all male prisoners,” with
transgender women often “forced into the victim role”). Despite the dearth of case law and scholarship
regarding incarcerated transgender men, see id. at 512–13, emerging research suggests that transgender
men experience different, but overlapping, forms of discrimination as compared with incarcerated
transgender women. See Shana Tabak & Rachel Levitan, LGBTI Migrants in Immigration Detention A
Global Perspective, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 27 n.107 (2014) (“Anecdotal evidence indicates that
transgender men housed in women’s prisons face physical and sexual violence, but more often from
guards than from other inmates.”); SYLVIA RIVERA L. PROJECT, “IT’S WAR IN HERE”: A REPORT ON THE
TREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX PEOPLE IN NEW YORK STATE MEN’S PRISONS 32 (2007),
https://srlp.org/files/warinhere.pdf [https://perma.cc/HV37-AG9D] (“As is the case in men’s prisons,
authorities in women’s prisons target transgender, gender non-conforming, and intersex people in those
facilities with verbal harassment, humiliation, excessive strip searches, and isolation, and refuse to
recognize their gender identities.”).
153. WPATH Standards of Care, supra note 16, at 68 (“Placement in a single-sex housing unit,
ward, or pod on the sole basis of the appearance of the external genitalia may not be appropriate and may
place the individual at risk for victimization.”).
154. See KNOW YOUR RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 10; see also Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 320
(7th Cir. 1993) (stating that, since the early 1990s, “[t]he practice of the federal prison authorities . . . [has
been] to incarcerate persons who have completed sexual reassignment with prisoners of the transsexual’s
new gender, but to incarcerate persons who have not completed it with prisoners of the transsexual’s
original gender”).
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legislation and litigation, these historical practices have begun to change,
although at a frustratingly slow pace for those subject to them.155
Under the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (“PREA”), the federal
government, and every jail or prison receiving federal dollars, must make an
“individualized determination[]” about whether an incarcerated transgender
person would be safer housed in a men’s or women’s facility.156 States like
California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, and localities
such as Denver, Colorado and Chicago, Illinois, similarly require, through
statute or administrative policy, an individualized determination regarding
the housing of incarcerated transgender people.157 Although, in practice,
these formal shifts in federal, state, and local policy often go ignored by
prison officials,158 they are an important step towards appropriate housing
for incarcerated transgender people.
Eighth Amendment litigation has also opened the doors to genderappropriate housing for incarcerated transgender people.159 A growing
155. See infra Part III.
156. 28 C.F.R. § 115.42(b) (2021); see also id. § 115.42(c) (“In deciding whether to assign a
transgender or intersex inmate to a facility for male or female inmates, and in making other housing and
programming assignments, the agency shall consider on a case-by-case basis whether a placement would
ensure the inmate’s health and safety, and whether the placement would present management or security
problems.” (emphasis added)). The PREA established a National Prison Rape Elimination Commission
to “carry out a comprehensive legal and factual study of the pen[o]logical, physical, mental, medical,
social, and economic impacts of prison rape in the United States” and to recommend to the Attorney
General “national standards for enhancing the detection, prevention, reduction, and punishment of prison
rape.” 42 U.S.C. § 30306(d)(1), (e)(1). The PREA standards are binding on the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
Id. § 30307(b). Generally speaking, states that do not certify full compliance with the PREA standards
are subject to the loss of five percent of any Department of Justice grant funds that they would otherwise
receive for prison purposes. Id. § 30307(e)(2)(A). During the Obama administration, the Federal Bureau
of Prisons, consistent with the PREA Standards, directed federal prisons to house transgender people “by
gender identity when appropriate.” TRANSGENDER OFFENDER MANUAL, supra note 127, at 6. In 2018,
the Trump administration changed this directive to state that housing transgender people by gender
identity “would be appropriate only in rare cases.” Id. The Biden administration has since revised the
policy to direct placement of transgender people based on a case-by-case assessment ensuring that a
placement does not “jeopardize” the person’s well-being. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
PROGRAM STATEMENT, NO. 5200.08: TRANSGENDER OFFENDER MANUAL 6 (Jan. 13, 2022), https://
www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5200-08-cn-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RTF2-RJY2].
157. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127 § 32A (West 2021) (“A prisoner of a correctional
institution, jail or house of correction that has a gender identity . . . that differs from the prisoner’s sex
assigned at birth, with or without a diagnosis of gender dysphoria or any other physical or mental health
diagnosis, shall be . . . housed in a correctional facility with inmates with the same gender identity.”);
accord CAL. PENAL CODE § 2606 (West Supp. 2022); CONN. GEN. STAT. Ann. § 18-81ii (West 2020);
see also Broadus & Minter, supra note 32, at 207 (discussing policies in Denver, Colorado; Chicago,
Illinois; Portland, Maine; and the District of Columbia, which require a case-by-case determination of
gender-appropriate housing for transgender people).
158. See Broadus & Minter, supra note 32, at 207; see also GLUCK MEZEY, supra note 43, at 62.
159. See infra Part III. In addition to the Eighth Amendment, transgender litigants have successfully
claimed that incarceration based on birth sex violates their rights under the Equal Protection and Due
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number of courts have concluded that prison officials may fail to protect
transgender people from a substantial risk of serious harm in violation of the
Eighth Amendment when they incarcerate transgender women—who are
“highly vulnerable” to sexual assault—in correctional facilities inconsistent
with their gender identity.160 For example, in 2004 in Green v. Bowles, the
Sixth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment to the state in a case in
which prison officials placed a transgender woman in an all-male protective
custody unit, where she was repeatedly assaulted.161 According to the Sixth
Circuit, the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show that she was
“vulnerable” to assault based on her “physical appearance” and transgender
status, and that prison officials failed to protect her in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.162
In 2015, in Diamond v. Owens, a federal district court in Georgia
similarly held that the plaintiff, an incarcerated transgender woman who was
repeated sexually assaulted in prison, stated a claim that prison officials
violated the Eighth Amendment by housing her in maximum security male
facilities, despite the “obvious” risk of sexual assault.163 And in 2020, in Tay
Process Clauses as well as under federal disability rights laws. See, e.g., Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No.
17-12255, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99925, at *26–30 (D. Mass. June 14, 2018) (holding that incarcerated
transgender woman stated claim that her incarceration in men’s prison violated due process, equal
protection, and disability rights laws); Tay v. Dennison, 457 F. Supp. 3d 657, 689 (S.D. Ill. 2020)
(granting preliminary injunction ordering state department of corrections to “come up with an
individualized housing plan” for a transgender woman incarcerated in men’s prison—including
consideration of transfer to women’s correctional facility—based on violations of Equal Protection
Clause and Eighth Amendment).
160. See infra notes 162–65.
161. Green v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 293–94 (6th Cir. 2004).
162. Green, 361 F.3d at 293–94 (6th Cir. 2004).
163. Diamond v. Owens, 131 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1378 (M.D. Ga. 2015); accord Zollicoffer v.
Livingston, 169 F. Supp. 3d 687, 690–91, 696 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (holding that incarcerated transgender
woman who was physically and sexually assaulted in men’s prison stated claim that prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm when they denied her repeated requests to be
transferred to a safer housing area); id. at 691 (“Transgender inmates in particular face a shockingly high
rate of sexual abuse in prison. The [Bureau of Justice Statistics] reported that 34.6% of transgender
inmates reported being the victim of sexual assault. That is nearly nine times the rate for all prisoners,
which is 4.0%. The vulnerability of incarcerated transgender people to sexual abuse is no secret. For
example, the National Institute of Corrections has stated that ‘research on sexual abuse in correctional
facilities consistently documented that men and women with nonheterosexual orientations, transgender
individuals, and people with intersex conditions were highly vulnerable to sexual abuse.’ ”); Lojan v.
Crumbsie, No. 12 CV 0320, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15590, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2013) (denying
motion to dismiss failure-to-protect claim and finding that Plaintiff stated a valid claim as she “allege[d]
that officials . . . acted with deliberate indifference to her safety because jail officials knew that she was
a likely victim . . . . [T]he argument that more than mere knowledge of Plaintiff’s transgender status was
required to put Defendant on notice of Plaintiff’s vulnerability is spurious”); Green v. Hooks, No. 6:13cv-17, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124806, at *3–4 (S.D. Ga. July 18, 2013) (holding that incarcerated
transgender person who was sexually assaulted in prison stated claim that prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to substantial risk of serious harm when they placed her in the general population
of an all-male prison, and in protective custody with a male inmate); Shaw v. District of Columbia, 944
F. Supp. 2d 43, 59–60 (D.D.C. 2013) (denying motion to dismiss where police officers placed the
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v. Dennison, the district court reserved a ruling on whether the plaintiff, an
incarcerated transgender woman, should be transferred to a women’s prison
until after trial, but it ordered the state department of corrections to “come
up with an individualized housing plan for [p]laintiff in accordance with its
affirmative duty to protect her from a substantial risk of harm.”164 According
to the district court, the department “should consider [plaintiff’s] assertion
that being housed in a men’s prison is the primary cause of her suffering
because, as a trans woman, she is especially vulnerable to physical and
sexual violence from her male counterparts,” and “whether the
reason . . . that she has not been able to receive treatment for her Gender
Dysphoria is because she is in a male prison . . . and whether in a women’s
facility, she would not be subjected to the same risk of sexual and physical
assault.”165
Several courts have acknowledged that inappropriate gendersegregated housing constitutes not only a failure to protect under the Eighth
Amendment, but also a failure to provide adequate medical care—namely,
access to social transition. In Monroe, for example, the district court granted
a preliminary injunction ordering prison officials “to immediately . . . cease
the policy and practice of depriving gender dysphoric prisoners of medically
necessary social transition, including by mechanically assigning housing
based on genitalia and/or physical size or appearance,” and to “develop a
policy to allow transgender inmates medically necessary social transition,
including individualized placement determinations.”166
Relatedly, prison officials’ placement of incarcerated transgender
people in solitary confinement for their own safety does not remedy the
Eighth Amendment violation.167 Rather, as at least one circuit court and
plaintiff, a transgender woman, “in a single cell in the male area of the Central Cellblock” despite “the
risk to transgender detainees [that] was obvious, well-documented, and known to [d]efendants”); Smith
v. Hayman, No. 09-2602, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15612, at *25 (D.N.J. Feb. 19, 2010) (permitting
plaintiff’s claim to proceed on grounds that “[p]laintiff’s publicized transsexualism would appear to place
h[er] at risk of serious harm from other inmates if housed in the same cell with another male, especially
after plaintiff has requested women’s clothing and amenities”); Doe v. Yates, No. 1:08-cv-01219, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106545, at *13–14 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2009) (holding that incarcerated transgender
person who was sexually assaulted in men’s prison stated claim that prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to substantial risk of serious harm when they housed her with “male aggressors” and
“threatened her with disciplinary action if she refused to take these other inmates as cell mates”); see also
Statement of Interest of United States, supra note 125, at 5 n.10 (reserving right to weigh in on, inter alia,
the constitutionality of the State’s housing transgender woman in maximum security men’s prison).
164. Tay v. Dennison, 457 F. Supp. 3d 657, 688 (S.D. Ill. 2020) (alteration in original).
165. Id. at 689; accord Hampton v. Baldwin, 2018 WL 5830730, at *16 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2018).
166. Monroe v. Baldwin, 424 F. Supp. 3d 526, 546–47 (S.D. Ill. 2019); see also Iglesias v. True,
403 F. Supp. 3d 680, 685 (S.D. Ill. 2019) (holding that an incarcerated transgender woman made out a
plausible claim that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by denying medically necessary care
for her gender dysphoria, including transfer to a woman’s correctional facility).
167. See infra Part III.
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numerous district courts have held, such confinement may violate the
Constitution by denying the person “adequate recreation, living space,
educational and occupational rehabilitation opportunities, and associational
rights for nonpunitive reasons” in light of other feasible alternatives168—
such as transfer to a gender-appropriate facility.169 Solitary confinement may
also run afoul of the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) standards,
which explicitly prohibit the involuntary segregation of transgender people
unless “a determination has been made that there is no available alternative
means of separation from likely abusers,” and which further provide that
segregation “shall not ordinarily exceed a period of [thirty] days.”170
As a result of these legislative and litigation developments, some
incarcerated transgender people are now being housed in gender-appropriate
facilities, either upon entry into prison or after requesting transfer. For
example, at least two transgender women in federal custody at the female
prison in Fort Worth, Donna Langan and Linda Thompson, have been
transferred to a federal woman’s prison.171 Furthermore, at least eight
168. Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 416 (7th Cir. 1987); id. at 415 (stating that segregation
of transgender person “may constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment”); see, e.g., Medina-Tejada v. Sacramento Cnty., No. CIV S-04-138, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7331, at *25–26 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2006) (denying summary judgment to the County because it had not
shown why automatic administrative segregation of transgender detainees—which included “significant
limitations on, or total denials of, recreational activities, exercise, phone calls, visitation privileges, outof-cell time, access to religious services, and access to the law library”—was not “excessive in relation
to the alleged safety purpose in keeping her segregated and why this purpose could not have been achieved
by alternative and less harsh methods”); Tates v. Blanas, No. CIV S-00-2539, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26029, at *28 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2003) (holding, after trial, that prison officials’ automatic placement of
all transgender detainees in administrative segregation—which included routine shackling and the denial
of opportunities to socialize, attend religious services, and shower—violated the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights, and stating that “[t]he duty to protect [the plaintiff] from harm may not be used to justify actions
not reasonably related to accomplishing that purpose. . . . The necessary consequence of [such
segregation] is to needlessly deprive transgender pretrial detainees of basic human needs and of privileges
available to all other inmates, and to needlessly subject transgender inmates to harsh conditions, as
discussed earlier in this opinion”); cf. Jones v. Union Cnty. Sheriff’s Off , No. 3:18-CV-00509, 2019 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 190588, at *17 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 4, 2019) (observing that “a policy of segregating
incarcerated transgender people may potentially raise constitutional concerns, depending on the
conditions of the segregation, which are not alleged here”).
169. See infra notes 171–72 (discussing placement of incarcerated transgender people in genderappropriate facilities); see also Affidavit of James Aiken ¶¶ 10, 18–19, Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No.
17-12255, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99925, at *26–30 (D. Mass. June 14, 2018) (stating that housing a
transgender woman “in a male correctional facility creates an unnecessary perilous endangerment for
her,” and opining that the plaintiff’s “safety requires that she be transferred to a women’s correctional
facility to abate this clear, present and known endangerment issue,” and that such a transfer would not
“create[] any security or management concern solely because she is a woman who is transgender as there
is nothing inherently dangerous about being a transgender person”).
170. 28 C.F.R. § 115.43(a), (c) (2021).
171. Lauren McGaughy, After Texas Suit, Trump Administration Reverses Prison Policies
Protecting Transgender Inmates, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (May 15, 2018, 4:30 PM), https://www.dallas
news.com/news/2018/05/15/after-texas-suit-trump-administration-reverses-prison-policies-protectingtransgender-inmates [https://perma.cc/8NAY-NQY8] (discussing incarceration of transgender women,
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transgender women in state custody have likewise been transferred to state
women’s prisons: Shiloh Quine in California, Adree Edmo in Idaho,
Strawberry Hampton and Janiah Monroe in Illinois, Angelina Resto in
Massachusetts, Sonia Doe in New Jersey, Jai Diamond in New York, and
Kanautica Zayre-Brown in North Carolina.172 Given the privacy and safety
considerations of all people in prison, these publicly known names suggest
the tip of a larger iceberg.
III. ACCESS TO TRANSITION SURGERY IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES Time and again, the restrictive and artificial lines that corrections
facilities have drawn around transition-related medical care have been
erased. From policies and practices that denied incarcerated transgender
people hormone therapy, commissary items, gender-appropriate strip
searches, and other gender-affirming care, to prison officials’ refusal to
house transgender people in gender-appropriate correctional facilities,
barriers to accessing appropriate medical care have gradually given way.173
As this Part will discuss, medically necessary transition surgery is no
exception to this trend, nor are there any legal or medical reasons why it
should be. In recent years, some state departments of corrections have begun
to provide transition surgery to incarcerated transgender people.174 Other
state departments of corrections will surely follow, as they must under the

Donna Langan and Linda Thompson, at a federal female prison in Fort Worth).
172. Doe v. Massachusetts Department of Correction, GLBTQ LEGAL ADVOCS. & DEFS. (Apr.
2019), https://www.glad.org/cases/doe-v-massachusetts-department-correction [https://perma.cc/DB56FBD5] (Resto); Matt Masterson, IDOC Transfers Another Transgender Inmate to Women’s Prison,
WINDOW TO THE WORLD (Apr. 3, 2019, 3:08 PM), https://news.wttw.com/2019/04/03/idoc-transfersanother-transgender-inmate-womens-prison [https://perma.cc/8A2Z-3QWX] (Monroe and Hampton);
Joe Hernandez, N.J. to Move Transgender Woman Out of Men’s Prison After Lawsuit, WHYY (Aug. 29,
2019), https://whyy.org/articles/nj-to-move-transgender-woman-out-of-mens-prison-after-lawsuit [https:
//perma.cc/9973-TWF9] (Doe); NC Transgender Inmate Moved to Women’s Facility After Advocates
Call for Transfer, ABC NEWS (Aug. 16, 2019), https://abc11.com/transgender-inmate-womensfacility/5469820 [https://perma.cc/CT35-EJ2Z] (Zayre-Brown); Kate Sosin, How a Women’s Facility
Gave This Trans Prisoner a Future, THEM. (July 3, 2019), https://www.them.us/story/jai-diamond-transwomen-prison [https://perma.cc/EL7Q-BG7X] (Diamond); Quine v. Beard, TRANSGENDER L. CTR.,
https://transgenderlawcenter.org/quine-v-beard [https://perma.cc/8BZY-JKRE] (Quine); see also
Matthew Clarke, Two Transgender Prisoners Transferred to Women’s Prison, PRISON LEGAL NEWS
(Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2019/mar/5/two-transgender-prisoners-trans
ferred-womens-prison [https://perma.cc/P6XW-ZW7J] (discussing transfers of Resto and Hampton); cf.
Guy v. Espinoza, No. 1:19-CV-00498, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9893, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2020)
(recommending dismissal with prejudice of claims that prison officials’ policy of housing transgender
women in women’s prison violated the constitutional rights of non-transgender women), dismissed, No.
1:19-CV-00498, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33838 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2020) (adopting findings and
recommendations of magistrate judge).
173. See supra Part II.
174. See infra notes 198–99 and accompanying text.
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Eighth Amendment. As with other barriers to transgender health and safety
in prison, access to transition surgery will be neither swift nor easy. But
change will come—bringing with it a more humanized understanding of
gender dysphoria and the medical care essential to transgender people’s
health and well-being. Given the recent and important developments in
access to transition surgery for incarcerated transgender people, this Part
discusses the issue in some detail.
A. THE TRANSITION SURGERY CIRCUIT CASES: FROM KOSILEK TO EDMO
The dramatic evolution in the law regarding access to transition surgery
traces an arc that began decades ago in the case of Kosilek v. Spencer, and
culminated in 2019, in the case of Edmo v. Corizon.175 In 1992, Michelle
Kosilek, an incarcerated transgender woman, sued the Massachusetts
Department of Corrections for failing to provide her with treatment for
gender dysphoria—namely, hormone therapy and transition surgery—in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.176 The district court found that Ms.
Kosilek “had proven the existence of a serious medical need and had shown
that her then-current treatment plan,” which consisted of only “supportive
therapy,” was inadequate, but ultimately concluded that there was no Eighth
Amendment violation.177 According to the court, prison officials “[were]
unaware that a failure to provide additional treatment to Kosilek might result
in serious harm,” and their “failure to provide treatment was rooted, at least
in part, in ‘sincere security concerns.’ ”178 Importantly, the district court
warned prison officials “that a failure to provide treatment in the future, now
that the [State] was on notice of the potential for harm if only ‘supportive
therapy’ was provided, could amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.”179
In 2003, after revising its policy of “freezing” an incarcerated person’s
treatment at whatever level that person was receiving prior to incarceration,
prison officials began providing additional ameliorative treatment to Ms.
Kosilek, including gender-appropriate clothing and personal effects,
electrolysis, and hormone therapy.180 In 2005, however, prison officials
denied Ms. Kosilek transition surgery against the recommendations of
multiple doctors hired by the state department of corrections, who testified
that transition surgery was medically necessary and, without it, Ms. Kosilek

175. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014); Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757 (9th
Cir. 2019).
176. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 69.
177. Id. (discussing the district court’s opinion).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 69–70.
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would likely attempt suicide as she had twice done in the past.181 Trial
commenced on May 30, 2006, with three rounds of testimony from
numerous officials and medical experts over the following two years, and
additional legal argument over the course of three more years.182 On
September 4, 2012, the district court held that prison officials’ refusal to
provide transition surgery to Ms. Kosilek violated the Eighth Amendment.183
According to the district court, prison officials “understood and accepted the
[department of correction] doctors’ view that Kosilek is at substantial risk of
serious harm and that [transition] surgery is the only adequate treatment for
[her] condition,” and the officials’ “purported security concerns [we]re a
pretext to mask the real reason for the decision to deny [her transition]
surgery—a fear of controversy, criticism, ridicule, and scorn.”184
In a 2-1 ruling, a three-judge panel of the First Circuit affirmed the
district court.185 However, on December 16, 2014, the First Circuit, sitting
en banc, reversed the district court, with a 3-2 majority and two sharplyworded dissents. Rejecting Ms. Kosilek’s Eighth Amendment claim, the
majority pointed to several “unique circumstances” in the case, including
prison officials’ purported security concerns and the credited testimony of
the State’s medical experts—three prominent critics of the WPATH
Standards186—who expressed doubts regarding the authoritativeness of the
Standards and the medical necessity of transition surgery.187 In her dissenting
opinion, Judge Thompson wrote, “I am confident that I would not need to
pen this dissent, over twenty years after Kosilek’s quest for constitutionally
adequate medical care began, were she not seeking a treatment that many see
as strange or immoral. Prejudice and fear of the unfamiliar have undoubtedly
played a role in this matter’s protraction.”188 Judge Thompson went on to
predict the case would not stand the test of time, “ultimately being shelved
with the likes of Plessy v. Ferguson.”189
181. Id. at 74.
182. See id. at 74–81.
183. Id. at 81–82.
184. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197–98 (D. Mass. 2012), rev’d, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir.
2014).
185. Kosilek v. Spencer, 740 F.3d 733, 773 (1st Cir.), withdrawn, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014).
186. Tellingly, numerous courts, before and after Kosilek, have explicitly found all three individuals
to be “outliers in the field of gender dysphoria treatment” and have given “virtually no weight” to their
testimony. Infra note 254.
187. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 91 (1st Cir. 2014) (“Certain facts in this particular
record—including the medical providers’ non-uniform opinions regarding the necessity of SRS,
Kosilek’s criminal history, and the feasibility of postoperative housing—were important factors
impacting the decision.”); id. at 76–79 (recounting testimony questioning the WPATH Standards of
Care).
188. Id. at 113 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
189. Id.
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Judge Thompson’s comments proved prescient.
On September 1, 2017, Adree Edmo, an incarcerated transgender
woman, sued the Idaho Department of Corrections for refusing to provide
her with medically necessary transition surgery in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.190 Prison officials had provided Ms. Edmo with hormone
therapy since 2012, but her gender dysphoria persisted, and she twice
attempted self-castration.191After a three-day evidentiary hearing, during
which the court heard from medical experts for Ms. Edmo and the State, the
district court held that Idaho Department of Correction’s failure to provide
transition surgery to Ms. Edmo violated the Eighth Amendment.192
On August 23, 2019, a unanimous panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court, holding “that Edmo has a serious medical need, that the
appropriate medical treatment is [transition surgery], and that prison
authorities have not provided that treatment despite full knowledge of
Edmo’s ongoing and extreme suffering and medical needs.”193 In its
decision, the Ninth Circuit explicitly distinguished Kosilek, stating that, in
contrast to that case, the State of Idaho did “not so much as allude to” security
concerns, and its medical experts agreed that the WPATH Standards were
“the appropriate benchmark regarding treatment for gender dysphoria” and
that “in certain circumstances, [transition surgery] can be a medically
necessary treatment for gender dysphoria.”194 On February 10, 2020, the
Ninth Circuit, over the objection of several Ninth Circuit judges, denied the
State’s petition for rehearing en banc.195
In July 2020, Ms. Edmo finally received transition surgery after the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to stay the district court’s injunction ordering the
State to provide the surgery.196 “So much pressure and inner turmoil is
gone,” Ms. Edmo said. “I feel whole and connected in myself. The surgery
itself was literally life-changing. I’m extremely grateful that I finally
received the treatment.”197 Ms. Edmo is among a growing group of
incarcerated people who have won the right to receive medically necessary

190. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied, 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir.
2020) (en banc).
191. Id. at 773–74.
192. See id. at 780 (discussing the district court’s decision).
193. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 767.
194. Id. at 767, 794.
195. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 949 F.3d 489, 490 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (denying rehearing).
196. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 141 S. Ct. 610 (2020) (denying petition for writ of certiorari);
Edmo v. Idaho Department of Correction, NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS., https://www.nclrights.org/ourwork/cases/edmo-v-idaho-department-of-correction [https://perma.cc/XL8X-6QEF].
197. Edmo v. Idaho Department of Correction, supra note 196.
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transition surgery.198 As her case demonstrates, there is an emerging trend
toward the provision of medically necessary transition surgery to people who
are incarcerated.199
Only two other circuit court cases have addressed the denial of
transition surgery under the Eighth Amendment: the Fifth Circuit’s decision
in Gibson and the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Lamb.200 Both cases bear little
weight. Unlike Kosilek and Edmo, Gibson and Lamb were litigated by pro se
plaintiffs and were resolved on concededly “sparse” records by district
courts in prediscovery proceedings—without benefit of any expert evidence
about the medical standard of care for gender dysphoria or evidence about
the plaintiffs’ individual medical condition or need for surgery.201 The
district courts ruled against the plaintiffs on summary judgment in both
cases, and the circuit courts of appeals affirmed.202
In Gibson, a bitterly-divided three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit,
relying heavily on Kosilek, held that Texas prison officials’ blanket ban on
transition surgery did not violate the Eighth Amendment because “there is
no consensus in the medical community about the necessity and efficacy of
[transition surgery] as a treatment for gender dysphoria.”203 In dissent, Judge
198. In 2017, Shiloh Quine became the first incarcerated transgender person to receive transition
surgery as part of a settlement with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. See,
e.g., Quine v. Beard, No. 14-cv-02726, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65276, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2017)
(“Under the Agreement, [the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation] agreed to provide
[transition] surgery to Plaintiff.”). And in 2020, after more than twenty years of litigation, the
Massachusetts Department of Corrections agreed to provide Michelle Kosilek with transition surgery.
Defendant’s Updated Status Report at 1, Kosilek v. Turco, No. 18-cv-11838 (D. Mass. Apr. 30, 2020);
see also Aviva Stahl, Transgender Prisoners What an Inmate’s Surgery Means for Trans Rights,
ROLLING STONE (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/transgenderprisoners-what-an-inmates-surgery-means-for-trans-rights-196781[https://perma.cc/F2ZG-Z34D]
(stating that, in California, “five [incarcerated] individuals have been approved for surgeries”).
199. See, e.g., Monroe v. Baldwin, 424 F. Supp. 3d 526, 546 (S.D. Ill. 2019) (stating that class
action plaintiffs “provided plenty of evidence that [state department of corrections] continuously fails to
provide adequate treatment to inmates with gender dysphoria,” including “never evaluat[ing] a single
inmate for surgical intervention”); Iglesias v. True, 403 F. Supp. 3d 680, 685 (S.D. Ill. 2019) (holding
that an incarcerated transgender woman made out a plausible claim that prison official violated the Eighth
Amendment by denying her medically necessary care for gender dysphoria, including transition surgery);
Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1170 (N.D. Cal.) (granting a preliminary injunction ordering
the state department of corrections “to provide Plaintiff with access to adequate medical care, including
[transition] surgery”), appeal dismissed, 802 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2015) (remanding to the district court);
Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 251 (D. Mass. 2012) (denying summary judgment to the State
for refusing to provide incarcerated transgender woman access to, inter alia, transition surgery).
200. See Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019); Lamb v. Norwood, 899 F.3d 1159 (10th
Cir. 2018).
201. See Gibson, 920 F.3d at 221; Lamb, 899 F.3d at 1163.
202. See supra note 201.
203. Gibson, 920 F.3d at 221; see id. at 218 (stating that prison’s “[p]olicy does not designate
[transition] surgery . . . as part of the treatment for [gender dysphoria]”); id. at 238 (Barksdale, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the State refused to have the plaintiff evaluated “not due to a conflicting medical
opinion, but instead based on a blanket policy”). Shockingly, the Fifth Circuit deliberately misgendered
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Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale argued that the majority had improperly relied on
a procedurally deficient and “inadequate summary-judgment record,” as well
as medical testimony in Kosilek that had since been deemed “not credible”
by multiple courts.204 In Lamb, the Tenth Circuit, in a pithy four-page
decision, unanimously affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment against the plaintiff, who conducted no discovery and submitted
no expert testimony.205
B. A NEW BREAK FOR TRANSGENDER RIGHTS
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Edmo, decided nearly thirty years after
Ms. Kosilek first sued prison officials to obtain access to transition surgery,
marks a new era for the rights of incarcerated transgender people.206 Edmo’s
holding makes clear that there is no justification for denying transgender
people all appropriate medical care, including surgery.207 There is no reason
in either law or policy for prison officials to pick and choose among the
medical needs of transgender people—or anyone else.208
Edmo offers four important takeaways regarding access to transition
surgery: (1) the professional standards that guide treatment for gender
dysphoria generally, and transition surgery specifically, enjoy a widespread

the plaintiff, a transgender woman, throughout its opinion, and, adding insult to injury, attempted to
support its action by relying on Supreme Court precedent affirming the civil rights of women under the
Equal Protection Clause). See id. at 217 n.2 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973),
for proposition that “sex . . . is an immutable characteristic determined solely by . . . birth”).
204. Gibson, 920 F.3d at 233–35, 242 (Barksdale, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Kosilek); see also
id. at 233 (“In the last four years [since Kosilek], have there been any developments in the medical
community regarding treating gender dysphoria and determining the necessity for [transition surgery]?
We do not know because . . . we have no expert testimony or any evidence as to the medical necessity
outside of the WPATH Standards of Care.”).
205. Lamb, 899 F.3d at 1164. In contrast to Gibson, the Tenth Circuit in Lamb “specifically
amended the opinion to delete language suggesting that there is no medical consensus on how to treat
gender dysphoria and that scientific advances in understanding gender dysphoria need not be considered.”
Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 23, Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 141 S. Ct. 610 (2020) (No. 191280). Compare Lamb v. Norwood, 895 F.3d 756, 759–60 (10th Cir. 2018), with Lamb, 899 F.3d at 1162,
1162 n.9 (“[S]cience has advanced since 1986, resulting in new forms of treatment for gender
dysphoria. . . . In the past decades, (surgical) care for people diagnosed with gender dysphoria is
increasingly provided in specialized, interdisciplinary health-care facilities following the Standards of
Care.”).
206. See Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 767 (9th Cir. 2019).
207. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (citing cases ruling in favor of incarcerated
transgender people seeking transition surgery).
208. See supra Part II (discussing various courts’ rulings in favor of transgender people who were
denied access to hormone therapy and social transition); see also Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060,
1068–70 (9th Cir. 2014) (denying summary judgment to the State and holding that a blanket policy of
denying cataract surgery in which a person has at least one “good eye” violates Eighth Amendment);
Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2003) (denying summary judgment to the State and
holding that a blanket policy of denying treatment of keloid scars to alleviate moderate chronic pain
violates Eight Amendment).
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medical consensus; (2) these standards are backed by sixty years of scientific
evidence; (3) arguments that attempt to undermine the WPATH standards or
misinterpret them as not applying to incarcerated people are without merit;
and (4) providing incarcerated transgender people with access to transition
surgery has broader implications for culture and law that extend well beyond
the prison gates.209 We discuss each in turn.
1. Transition Surgery Has Attained Widespread Acceptance in the Medical
Community and Beyond
As the Ninth Circuit in Edmo and numerous courts have held, the
“weight of opinion in the medical and mental health communities agrees that
[transition surgery] is safe, effective, and medically necessary in appropriate
circumstances” for the treatment of gender dysphoria.210 It is neither
experimental nor cosmetic.211 Support for this consensus can be found in the
209. See infra Section III.B.
210. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 770; see, e.g., Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1171 (N.D. Cal.
2015) (“Studies have shown that [transition surgery] is a safe and effective treatment for individuals with
gender dysphoria.”); O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 69 (2010) (“The evidence is clear that a
substantial segment of the psychiatric profession has been persuaded of the advisability and efficacy of
hormone therapy and [transition] surgery as treatment for [gender dysphoria], as have many courts.”);
WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 54–55 (stating that, for many transgender individuals, “surgery is
essential and medically necessary to alleviate their gender dysphoria. For th[is] . . . group, relief from
gender dysphoria cannot be achieved without modification of their primary and/or secondary sex
characteristics to establish greater congruence with their gender identity.” (citation omitted)); DSM-5,
supra note 46, at 451 (discussing physical interventions, including surgery, that alleviate gender
dysphoria); NCD 140.3, Transsexual Surgery, supra note 34, at 20 (noting “a consensus among
researchers and mainstream medical organizations that [transition] surgery is an effective, safe and
medically necessary treatment for [gender dysphoria]”).
211. See, e.g., Edmo, 935 F.3d at 770 (“[Transition] surgery is not considered experimental or
cosmetic; it is an accepted, effective, medically indicated treatment for [gender dysphoria].” (quoting
De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 523 (4th Cir. 2013))); WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 58
(“[M]ost professionals agree that genital surgery and mastectomy cannot be considered purely
cosmetic.”); WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, POSITION STATEMENT ON MEDICAL
NECESSITY OF TREATMENT, SEX REASSIGNMENT, AND INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE U.S.A. 3 (2016),
https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/Web%20Transfer/Policies/WPATH-Position-on-Medica
l-Necessity-12-21-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7JA-WDZ3] (“The medical procedures attendant to
gender affirming/confirming surgeries are not ‘cosmetic’ or ‘elective’ or ‘for the mere convenience of the
patient.’ These reconstructive procedures are not optional in any meaningful sense, but are understood to
be medically necessary for the treatment of the diagnosed condition.”); STATE OF CONN. COMM’N ON
HUM. RTS. & OPPORTUNITIES, DECLARATORY RULING ON PETITION REGARDING HEALTH INSURERS’
CATEGORIZATION OF CERTAIN GENDER-CONFIRMING PROCEDURES AS COSMETIC 8 (2020),
https://ctchro.files.wordpress.com/2020/04/declaratory-ruling.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PZ7K-VGX8]
(“[N]o treatment for gender dysphoria can be deemed cosmetic. . . . This is because procedures altering
the appearance of transgender patients for treatment of gender dysphoria are not for the purpose of
‘enhancing’ cosmetic beauty—they are medically indicated for the purpose of bringing a transgender
patient’s appearance in accordance with their gender identity to eliminate the stress caused by
incongruence of the same. . . . [T]he goal is to ‘modify . . . characteristics from [one sex to another] in
order to allow a person to live and function in their affirmed gender, thereby reducing or eliminating their
gender dysphoria.’ ”) (quoting Dr. Randi Ettner)); O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 70–71 (concluding that
transition surgery was not “cosmetic surgery” for tax purposes); NCD 140.3, Transsexual Surgery, supra
note 34, at 20 (“[T]he [National Coverage Determination]’s reasons for asserting that [transition] surgery
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long line of leading professional organizations that endorse the WPATH
Standards, including the National Commission on Correctional
Healthcare,212 and in the inclusion of transition surgery in prominent surgical
text books and psychiatric reference texts.213
Longstanding decisions by multiple federal agencies further support
this consensus, as do a number of state department of corrections policies.214
In 2011, the Internal Revenue Service acquiesced in the 2010 decision of the
U.S. Tax Court that transition surgery is not “cosmetic surgery” and is a
deductible medical expense under the Internal Revenue Code.215 On May 30,
2014, an impartial adjudicative board in the U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services invalidated its 1989 determination denying Medicare
coverage of transition surgery and concluded, based on decades of studies,
that surgical care to treat gender dysphoria is safe, effective, and not
experimental.216 The board’s decision specifically noted that there was
sufficient evidence to prove “a consensus among researchers and mainstream
medical organizations that transsexual surgery is an effective, safe[,] and
medically necessary treatment for [gender dysphoria].”217 Ever since the
adjudicative board’s decision, Medicare has provided coverage for
transition-related surgery based on patients’ individual needs.218 In 2016, the
was experimental are no longer valid.”).
212. See Transgender and Gender Diverse Health Care in Correctional Settings, supra note 105
(discussing provision of “gender-affirming surgical procedures . . . when determined to be medically
necessary for a patient” consistent with WPATH Standards).
213. See O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 65–66 (“[E]very psychiatric reference text that has been
established as authoritative in this case endorses [transition] surgery as a treatment for [gender dysphoria]
in appropriate circumstances. No psychiatric reference text has been brought to the Court’s attention that
fails to list, or rejects, the triadic therapy sequence or [transition] surgery as the accepted treatment
regimen for [gender dysphoria].”); NCD 140.3, Transsexual Surgery, supra note 34, at 21 (discussing the
inclusion of transition surgeries “in prominent surgical text books” as evidence of consensus).
214. See infra notes 215–20 and accompanying text.
215. See O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 61, action on dec., 2011-47 (Nov. 21, 2011).
216. See NCD 140.3, Transsexual Surgery, supra note 34, at 24; id. at 21, 24 (concluding that the
National Center for Health Care Technology’s assertion in 1981 report that transition surgery “must be
considered still experimental” because “[t]he safety and effectiveness of transsexual surgery as a
treatment of transsexualism is not proven and is questioned” was “not reasonable in light of the
unchallenged new evidence”).
217. Id. at 20; see also id. at 22 (stating that the “unchallenged new evidence” demonstrated, inter
alia, that transition surgery “has been performed thousands of times with surgeons around the world and
has been proven to be a medically necessary and successful treatment, saving many lives and significantly
improving the lives of those who undergo this surgery”).
218. See id. at 20. The determination of whether transition surgery is medically necessary for
individual Medicare recipients is made by private health care insurers (Medicare Administrative
Contractors) on a case-by-case basis. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DECISION MEMO
FOR GENDER DYSPHORIA AND GENDER REASSIGNMENT SURGERY, No. CAG-00446N § IX (2016),
https://www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-database/details/nca-decision-memo.aspx?NCAId=282 [https:
//perma.cc/7RKG-TCCP]. In 2016, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”), an agency
within DHHS, refrained from issuing national standards (that is, a National Coverage Determination) for
determining the medical necessity of transition surgery for Medicare recipients—noting that this
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Department of Defense approved procedures permitting active-duty
transgender service members to receive “cross-sex hormone therapy or other
medical procedures,” including surgery, while serving.219 Additionally,
numerous state departments of corrections explicitly require prison officials
to provide incarcerated transgender people with access to transition-related
care, including surgery.220
Further support for this consensus can be found in public and private
healthcare plans’ coverage of transition surgery.221 In addition to Medicare
coverage for transition surgery,222 the overwhelming majority of Medicaid
programs—forty states and the District of Columbia—have either removed
or never adopted exclusions of transition surgery in their Medicaid
programs.223 Additionally, the federal Office of Personnel Management
prohibits the exclusion of transition surgery in federal employee health

population includes many older adults and people with disabilities, whose health outcomes may differ
from those of the general population based on their “unique and complex needs.” Id. §§ VII(8)(b)(11),
VIII(c), IX. The CMS decision clarified that transition surgery “may be a reasonable and necessary
service for certain [Medicare] beneficiaries with gender dysphoria,” but “[t]he current scientific
information is not complete for CMS to make a [national coverage determination] that identifies the
precise patient population for whom the service would be reasonable and necessary.” Id. § VII(8)(b)(3).
But see Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 223 n.7 (5th Cir. 2019) (erroneously arguing that CMS “found
that there was insufficient expert medical evidence to support [transition] surgery with respect to
Medicare and Medicaid patients”). Importantly, CMS’s conclusion does not undermine the medical
necessity of transition surgery; indeed, the appropriateness of most medical and surgical care provided to
patients is determined on an individualized basis, taking into account each patient’s unique clinical
circumstances, and not by national standards. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra
note 218, § IX (“We are not making a national coverage determination relating to counseling, hormone
therapy treatments, or any other potential treatment for gender dysphoria.”).
219. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 1300.28, IN-SERVICE TRANSITION FOR TRANSGENDER
SERVICE MEMBERS 1, 16 (2016), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2016/0616_policy/DoDInstruction-1300.28.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6XN-8TZF].
220. See, e.g., CAL. CORR. HEALTH CARE SERVS., GUIDELINES FOR REVIEW OF REQUESTS FOR
GENDER AFFIRMING SURGERIES 1–4 (2018), https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3Aa
aid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A4dace6e8-5ad9-481f-912c-91f7ebd25398#pageNum=1v [https://perma.cc/8N
L9-JGE4] (providing process for referral and review of requests for transition surgery); R.I. DEP’T OF
CORR., supra note 128, at 11 (stating that “[t]ransgender inmates will receive all medical care, treatment
and the maintenance of any ongoing procedures related to the transition process”—including transition
surgery—“utilizing the standard care afforded to all [Rhode Island Department of Corrections]
inmates. . . .”); see also Rourth et al., supra note 43, at 18 (compiling state policies).
221. See infra notes 222–29 and accompanying text. Transition-related care, including surgery, has
long been covered by national health plans outside of the United States, including in Argentina, Brazil,
Canada, Cuba, Iran, and the following European countries: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See TRANSGENDER LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND,
MEMORANDUM TO PLAN ADMINISTRATORS RE: LIABILITY FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH CARE
EXCLUSIONS IN EMPLOYER HEALTH PLANS 10–11 (2021).
222. NCD 140.3, Transsexual Surgery, supra note 34, at 1 (eliminating exclusion for transitionrelated surgery).
223. See Healthcare Laws and Policies Medicaid, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT,
www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies [https://perma.cc/2VUR-FL6Q].
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plans,224 and seventeen states and the District of Columbia cover transition
surgery in state employee health plans.225
As for private healthcare coverage, twenty-four states and the District
of Columbia prohibit the exclusion of transition surgery in private
insurance.226 Over ninety-one percent of the 1,142 private-sector businesses
surveyed in the Human Rights Campaign’s 2021 Corporate Equality Index,
and over seventy-one percent of Fortune 500 businesses, cover transition
surgery in employer-sponsored health insurance plans.227 Insurance
companies have overwhelmingly eliminated exclusions for transition
surgery from individual health insurance plans,228 and all major insurance
companies administer employer-sponsored health insurance plans that cover
transition surgery.229
2. Transition Surgery Is Supported by a Significant Body of Medical
Evidence
As alluded to by the Ninth Circuit in Edmo, the broad consensus in
support of transition surgery derives from a robust body of medical evidence,
dating back more than sixty years, which overwhelmingly demonstrates
transition surgery’s safety and efficacy.230
As the U.S Tax Court concluded in O’Donnabhain, the medical
literature provides “ample proof of [transition surgery’s] positive therapeutic
224. U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., FEHB PROGRAM CARRIER LETTER NO. 2015-12, COVERED
BENEFITS FOR GENDER TRANSITION SERVICES (2015), https://www.opm.gov/healthcare-insur
ance/healthcare/carriers/2015/2015-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V4V-Q242] (“[N]o carrier participating in
the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program may have a general exclusion of services, drugs or
supplies related to gender transition or ‘sex transformations.’ ”).
225. Healthcare Laws and Policies State Employee Benefits, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT
PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies [https://perma.cc/2VUR
-FL6Q].
226. Healthcare Laws and Policies Private Insurance, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT,
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies [https://perma.cc/2VUR-FL6Q].
227. HRC INDEX, supra note 17, at 6, 18.
228. See OUT2ENROLL, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: 2018 MARKETPLACE PLAN COMPLIANCE WITH
SECTION 1557, at 1–3, https://www.out2enroll.org/out2enroll/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Overview-ofTrans-Exclusions-in-2018-Marketplace-Plans-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/SX3U-H4B5] (surveying 500
individual health insurance plans across eighteen states and finding that ninety percent of such plans did
not exclude transition-related care).
229. See TRANSGENDER LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, supra note 221, at 9–10.
230. See Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 771–72 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing scientific studies
supporting necessity and efficacy of transition surgery); see also Declaration of George Richard Brown
Supporting Opposition, supra note 65, ¶¶ 13–14 (“Sixty years of clinical experience and data have
demonstrated the efficacy of treatment for the distress resulting from gender dysphoria . . . ” (citing a
multi-country, long-term follow-up study)). The earliest recorded transition surgeries using modern
surgical techniques took place in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s at Dr. Magnus Hirschfeld’s Institute
for Sexual Science, and evidence of alterations to male genitals dates back to ancient times. See Beemyn,
supra note 16, at 506; Dallas Denny, Transgender Communities, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 175 (2006).
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outcomes.”231 In 1981, two years after the formulation of the original
Standards of Care by the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria
Association (now WPATH), Dr. Ira Pauly, an American psychiatrist,
published the results of a large retrospective study of people who had
undergone transition surgery.232 The results were overwhelmingly positive.
“Among 83 [Female-to-Male] patients, 80.7% had a satisfactory outcome
([that is], patient self-report of ‘improved social and emotional adjustment’),
6.0% unsatisfactory. Among 283 [Male-to-Female] patients, 71.4% had a
satisfactory outcome, 8.1% unsatisfactory.”233
The 1981 study “included patients who were treated before the
publication and use of the Standards of Care.”234 Since the Standards of Care
have been in place, moreover, “there has been a steady increase in patient
satisfaction and decrease in dissatisfaction with the outcome of [transition]
surgery,” with the “vast majority of follow-up studies . . . show[ing] an
undeniable beneficial effect of [transition] surgery on postoperative
outcomes such as subjective well being, cosmesis, and sexual function,” and
no patient regret from having had surgery—even among those who
“develop[ed] severe surgical complications post-surgery.”235
Recent studies confirm the necessity and efficacy of transition surgery.
According to a 2014 study, “a significant body of evidence shows that
treatment can alleviate symptoms among those who do experience distress.
A meta-analysis of more than 2,000 patients in seventy-nine studies
published between 1961 and 1991 found “[f]avorable effects of therapies
that included both hormones and surgery . . . Most patients reported
improved psychosocial outcomes, ranging between [eighty-seven percent]
for [male-to-female] patients and [ninety-seven percent] for [female-tomale] patients.”236 Moreover, these “[s]atisfaction rates have increased over
time: studies have been reporting a steady improvement in outcomes as the
field becomes more advanced.”237 Indeed, a 2010 study found that “almost
all patients were satisfied with [transition surgery] at [five] years, and
[eighty-six percent] were assessed by clinicians at follow-up as stable or
231. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 68 (2010) (citing psychiatric reference texts).
232. See WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 107.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.; see also id. at 108 (“[M]ost [patients] reported being satisfied with the cosmetic and
functional results of the surgery.” (citing studies)); see also Edmo, 935 F.3d at 771 (“Scientific studies
show that the regret rate for individuals who undergo [transition surgery] is low, in the range of one to
two percent.” (citing studies)).
236. M. Joycelyn Elders, George R. Brown, Eli Coleman, Thomas A. Kolditz & Alan M. Steinman,
Medical Aspects of Transgender Military Service, 41 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 199, 175 (2014).
237. Id.; see also WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 108 (“Patients operated on after 1986 did
better than those before 1986; this reflects significant improvement in surgical complications.”).
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improved in global functioning.”238
Most studies of the outcomes of surgeries and other transition-related
treatments have been retrospective—that is, the studies analyzed health
outcomes for those who had already undergone surgery and other transitionrelated treatments.239 Although fewer in number, there have been several
prospective studies that analyzed health outcomes for individuals before and
after undergoing surgery and other transition-related treatments. For
example, a 2005 study, which evaluated 325 consecutive adult and
adolescent subjects seeking transition-related care, “affirm[ed] the results
from retrospective studies that a combination of hormone therapy and
surgery improves gender dysphoria and other areas of psychosocial
functioning.”240 Specifically, the study found that surgery and hormone
therapy reduced gender dysphoria and body dissatisfaction and also
improved psychological function.241 Additionally, a 2016 study, which
analyzed thirty-eight prior studies in order to determine the psychiatric
outcome for individuals following surgery and other transition-related
treatments, concluded that people who undergo such treatments report
mental health conditions at rates similar to nontransgender people.242
According to the report:
longitudinal studies investigating the same cohort of trans people pre- and
post-interventions showed an overall improvement in psychopathology
and psychiatric disorders post-treatment. In fact, the findings from most
studies showed that the [quality-of-life] scores of trans people following
[gender-confirming medical interventions] were similar to those of the
general population.243

3. Arguments Defending Denials of Access to Transition Surgery Do Not
Withstand Scrutiny
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Edmo rightly rejected several meritless
arguments advanced by states to avoid their medical treatment obligations
under the Eighth Amendment.244 Specifically, the WPATH Standards’
requirement that coexisting mental health concerns unrelated to a person’s
gender dysphoria be well-controlled prior to undergoing surgery245 poses no
238. WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 109.
239. See id. at 107.
240. Id. at 109.
241. Id.
242. See Cecilia Dhejne, Roy Van Vlerken, Gunter Heylens & Jon Arcelus, Mental Health and
Gender Dysphoria A Review of the Literature, 28 INT’L REV. PSYCHIATRY 44, 53 (2016).
243. Id.
244. See infra notes 245–54 and accompanying text.
245. WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 105–06. These mental health concerns include
“psychotic conditions and other serious mental illnesses” such as “bipolar disorder, dissociative identity
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barrier to incarcerated transgender people who experience anxiety,
depression, self-harm, and suicidality as a result of gender dysphoria.246 As
the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded, “[c]oexisting medical or mental health
issues resulting from a person’s gender dysphoria are not an impediment” to
surgery; indeed, transition surgery ameliorates these symptoms of gender
dysphoria.247
Additionally, the WPATH Standards’ requirement that people socially
transition twelve months prior to undergoing surgery also poses no barrier to
incarcerated transgender people, who can and often do socially transition in
prison.248 For example, Adree Edmo changed her legal name and the sex on
her birth certificate while incarcerated and consistently presented as
female.249 Michelle Kosilek likewise presented as female, wearing genderappropriate clothing, as did Dee Farmer, the plaintiff in the Supreme Court’s
1994 decision that established an Eighth Amendment violation for prison
officials’ failure to protect.250 Indeed, the Eighth Amendment, as well as
some state laws—not to mention the WPATH Standards themselves—
demand access to social transition in prison.251 Several of those state laws,
moreover, explicitly require that incarcerated transgender people receive
transition surgery.252
Lastly, the decades-old testimony relied on by the First Circuit in
Kosilek and recycled by the Fifth Circuit in Gibson (and also by several
disorder, [and] borderline personality disorder,” which can impair a person’s ability to discern reality. Id.
at 61; Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 776 (9th Cir. 2019) (discussing “thought disorders” and
“impaired reality testing” in connection with qualification for transition surgery).
246. See DSM-5, supra note 46, at 454–55 (stating that the “development of depression, anxiety,
and substance abuse . . . may be a consequence of gender dysphoria,” and that “[a]dolescents and adults
with gender dysphoria before gender reassignment are at increased risk for suicidal ideation, suicide
attempts, and suicides”); see also Edmo, 935 F.3d at 769 (“Left untreated . . . [gender dysphoria] can lead
to debilitating distress, depression, impairment of function, substance use, self-surgery to alter one’s
genitals or secondary sex characteristics, self-injurious behaviors, and even suicide.”).
247. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 771; see id. at 776–77 (stating that transition surgery would “eliminate much
of the depression and the attendant symptoms [of gender dysphoria] that [the plaintiff] is experiencing,”
and that plaintiff’s suicide attempts and cutting behaviors did not “indicate[] that [the plaintiff] has
inadequately controlled mental health concerns,” but rather indicated the need for transition surgery
(quoting plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Randi Ettner)); id. at 778 (stating that transition surgery would alleviate
the risk of self-castration attempts (quoting plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Gorton)); accord Kosilek v. Spencer,
774 F.3d 63, 73 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[T]he likelihood that [the plaintiff] would become suicidal if denied
surgery was, to the [plaintiff’s] doctors, not a contraindication to her eligibility, but instead was a
symptom that could be alleviated by provision of [transition surgery].”); see also DSM-5, supra note 46,
at 451 (“[M]any [individuals with gender dysphoria] are distressed if the desired physical interventions
by means of hormones and/or surgery are not available.” (emphasis added)).
248. WPATH Standards, supra note 16, at 106.
249. See Edmo, 935 F.3d at 772.
250. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 70; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994).
251. See supra notes 130–72 (discussing access to social transition).
252. See supra note 128 (discussing state administrative policies requiring that incarcerated
transgender people receive hormone therapy and other medically necessary transition-related care).
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Ninth Circuit judges in their unsuccessful bid to rehear Edmo en banc),
which suggested that there was no medical consensus to support transition
surgery, is, according to the Ninth Circuit, “incorrect, or at best outdated.”253
Several courts have gone further, characterizing the sources of that testimony
as “outliers in the field of gender dysphoria treatment” and “not credible,”
and giving “virtually no weight” to their testimony.254
4. Providing Access to Transition Surgery Has Broader Cultural and Legal
Significance
State departments of corrections’ provision of access to transition
surgery not only meets the health needs of transgender people in satisfaction
of the Eighth Amendment, but it also has important implications for the
progress of transgender people, beyond the prison gates, in culture and in
law.
First, because transgender people of color are disproportionately
represented in criminal justice facilities,255 the denial of essential care,
including surgery, has a deeply troubling racial dimension. One account of
the community suggests that nearly one-half of all Black transgender people
have been incarcerated.256 Black transgender lives matter, especially in this
context.257 By providing access to transition surgery, state departments of
corrections, in this modest way, support racial justice, rather than standing
as a bulwark against it.
Second, the denial of access to transition surgery often reflects a
mistrust, or even disdain, for science by crediting the outdated views of a
253. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 795.
254. Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 358 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1126 (D. Idaho 2018) (“Under these
circumstances, the Court gives virtually no weight to the opinions of Defendants’ experts . . . .”); see also
Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“The Court gives very little weight to
the opinions of Levine, whose report misrepresents the Standards of Care; overwhelmingly relies on
generalizations about gender dysphoric prisoners, rather than an individualized assessment of
Norsworthy; contains illogical inferences; and admittedly includes references to a fabricated anecdote.”);
O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 64, 74 (2010) (“Since Dr. Schmidt did not [interview the
plaintiff], his analysis is entitled to considerably less weight . . . Respondent has not shown that Dr.
Schmidt’s concept of medical necessity is widely accepted, and it strikes the Court as idiosyncratic and
unduly restrictive.”); see also Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 234–35 (5th Cir. 2019) (Barksdale, J.,
dissenting) (“The courts in Edmo and Norsworthy found those doctors not credible in the light of their
misrepresentations and refusal to subscribe to the medically-accepted standards of care—WPATH.”).
255. See Transgender Incarcerated People in Crisis, LAMBDA LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.
org/know-your-rights/article/trans-incarcerated-people [https://perma.cc/SAD3-NH6G].
256. Id.; see also STRYKER, supra note 13, at 208.
257. See Isabella Grullón Paz & Maggie Astor, Black Trans Women Seek More Space in the
Movement They Helped Start, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/27/us/
politics/black-trans-lives-matter.html [https://perma.cc/8DHK-GNHW]. See generally Kortney Ryan
Ziegler & Naim Rasul, Race, Ethnicity, and Culture, in TRANS BODIES, TRANS SELVES: A RESOURCE
FOR THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY, supra note 15, at 29 (discussing institutionalized racism
experienced by transgender people of color).
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diminishing cohort of discredited doctors on the fringe of gender dysphoria
treatment over the consensus view of the national and international medical
community that transition surgery is essential medical care.258 By providing
access to transition surgery, state departments of corrections help to expose
and undermine the outdated myth, founded on no science, that transition
surgery is controversial, experimental, or frivolous,259 and show transition
surgery for what it is: a mainstream, successful treatment for a serious
medical condition.
Third, the denial of access to transition surgery runs counter to the
overwhelming national trend supporting coverage of such treatment in public
and private healthcare.260 States that provide access to transition surgery to
incarcerated transgender people are in harmony with the federal
government’s coverage of transition surgery under Medicare and federal
employee health plans.261 They are also consistent with states that cover
transition surgery under Medicaid and state employee health plans, and with
states that require coverage of transition surgery in private insurance
plans.262 These states are also in line with the many private businesses that
provide transition surgery coverage for their employees, and with the
overwhelming number of insurance companies that provide and administer
health insurance that covers transition surgery.263
Fourth, the denial of access to transition surgery is historically rooted
in stigma, that is, in prejudice and stereotypes toward transgender people and
ignorance and neglect of their medical needs.264 In Diamond v. Owens, for
258. See supra note 82 (discussing Dr. Paul McHugh).
259. NCD 140.3, Transsexual Surgery, supra note 34, at 23 (stating that views in opposition to
transition surgery in 1981 “fall far outside the mainstream psychological, psychiatric, and medical
professional consensus” and are “completely unscientific”).
260. See supra notes 220–28 and accompanying text (discussing coverage of transition surgery in
public and private healthcare plans).
261. NCD 140.3, Transsexual Surgery, supra note 34, at 1 (eliminating exclusion for transitionrelated surgery); see U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., supra note 224 (“[N]o carrier participating in the Federal
Employees Health Benefits Program may have a general exclusion of services, drugs or supplies related
to gender transition or ‘sex transformations.’ ”).
262. See supra notes 223, 225–59 and accompanying text (discussing state coverage of transition
surgery in public and private health plans).
263. See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text (discussing coverage of transition surgery in
individual health insurance plans and employer-sponsored health insurance plans).
264. See, e.g., NCD 140.3, Transsexual Surgery, supra note 34, at 24 (discussing opposition to
Medicare’s coverage of transition surgery in 1981 because it was not considered “social[ly]
acceptab[le]”); JOANNE MEYEROWITZ, HOW SEX CHANGED 12 (2002) (observing the popular belief that
people who undergo transition are “social frauds” who “misrepresent themselves, deceive themselves
(and presumably others) as they attempt to pass as something they are not”); see also Grimm v. Gloucester
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 616–17 (4th Cir. 2020) (discussing history of discrimination against
transgender people); Flack v. Wis. Dept. of Health Servs., 328 F. Supp. 3d 931, 953 (W.D. Wis. 2018)
(same); cf. Henderson v. Thomas, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1317–18 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (declaring
unconstitutional Alabama’s policy of segregating HIV-positive prisoners because it was based on
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example, a prison warden refused to permit an incarcerated transgender
woman to socially transition, stating that “he didn’t like [the plaintiff’s]
eyebrows and ‘we aren[’]t going to do that[.] ‘This is a man’s
facility.’ ”265 And in Kosilek, the plaintiff presented evidence that prison
officials’ refusal to provide transition surgery to an incarcerated transgender
person were motivated by fears that providing transition surgery would
invite political controversy and public ridicule.266 By providing access to
transition surgery, state departments of corrections reduce this stigma and
align prison practices with the common sense of the public—an
overwhelming majority of whom support transgender rights generally and
access to transition surgery, in particular.267
Lastly, the denial of access to transition surgery is often based on
misplaced concerns about costs of care.268 For example, the Governor of
Idaho stated in a press releases that “[t]he hard working taxpayers of Idaho
should not be forced to pay for [Adree Edmo’s] gender reassignment
surgery . . . We cannot divert critical public dollars away from our focus on
keeping the public safe and rehabilitating offenders.”269 Similarly, in
“outdated and unsupported assumptions about HIV” and reflected an “intentional bias against HIVpositive people,” and chiding corrections officials for declaring that, “[W]e live in
Alabama. . . . Prejudices . . . die hard in Alabama,” in response to the question of why the policy was
continued after the facts of HIV transmission had become known).
265. Diamond v. Owens, 131 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1364 (M.D. Ga. 2015).
266. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 198 (D. Mass. 2012). The district court in Kosilek
credited this evidence, holding that purported security concerns were “a pretext to mask the real reason
for the decision to deny [Ms. Kosilek] sex reassignment surgery—a fear of controversy, criticism,
ridicule, and scorn.” Id. at 198. The First Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed, concluding that the district
court’s assumption that the Department of Corrections Commissioner’s “acting in response to ‘public and
political criticism’ . . . . necessarily carried over to her successors and governed their actions [wa]s
unsupported by the record.” Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 94–95 (1st Cir. 2014).
267. Winston Luhur, Taylor N.T. Brown & Andrew R. Flores, Public Opinion of Transgender
Rights in the United States, WILLIAMS INST. (Aug. 2019), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/
publications/public-opinion-trans-rights-us [https://perma.cc/5JDH-VPDF] (reporting that seventy-three
percent of respondents believed that transgender people should be protected from discrimination, and
seventy-one percent believed transgender people should have access to transition surgery).
268. Although cost is a common reason that states deny transition surgery, it is not a legitimate one.
See, e.g., Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 705 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Lack of
funds . . . cannot justify an unconstitutional lack of competent medical care and treatment for inmates.”);
Kosilek, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 210–11 (citing cases in Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits for proposition that cost is no defense for inadequate medical care under Eighth Amendment);
see also Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 2011) (rejecting argument that gender dysphoria
treatment could lawfully be excluded from healthcare coverage due to cost); accord Toomey v. Arizona,
No. CV-19-00035, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219781, at *6–9 (D. Ariz. Dec. 23, 2019); Boyden v. Conlin,
341 F. Supp. 3d 979, 1000–03 (W.D. Wis. 2018); Flack v. Wis. Dept. of Health Servs., 328 F. Supp. 3d
931, 954–55 (W.D. Wis. 2018); Hicklin v. Precynthe, No. 4:16–cv–01357, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21516,
at *49–50 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 9, 2018); Stockman v. Trump, No. EDCV 17–1799, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
221323, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017); Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 243 (D. Mass. 2012).
269. Press Release, Idaho Off. of the Governor, Idaho Appeals Ruling in Transgender Inmate
Surgery Case (Jan. 9, 2019), https://gov.idaho.gov/pressrelease/idaho-appeals-ruling-in-transgenderinmatesurgery-case [https://perma.cc/3ZL4-NKCY]; see also Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 119 F.
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Massachusetts, the Lieutenant Governor publicly opposed using tax
revenues to provide transition surgery to Michelle Kosilek; a state senator
introduced legislation to prohibit the department of corrections from paying
for transition surgery; state legislators wrote letters to the commissioner of
the department of corrections “express[ing] ‘outrage’ at the request that
taxpayers fund a ‘sex-change’ operation for Kosilek,” noting the strained
state budget and threatening to reduce the department’s funding if surgery
were provided; and local media consistently published articles and editorials
“specifically opposing the expenditure of taxpayer funds to provide such
treatment.”270
Numerous studies show that the cost of covering transition surgery is
inconsequential or cost-neutral because transgender people comprise a
relatively small percentage of the inmate population, and not all transgender
people undergo all available treatments.271 Indeed, departments of
Supp. 3d 1271, 1278–79 (D. Idaho 2015) (finding that clinical supervisor for Idaho State Corrections
Institute instructed clinicians “to not diagnose inmates with gender identity disorder . . . so that [the
prison] would not have to pay for gender identity disorder treatment”).
270. Kosilek, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 246.
271. See, e.g., Flack v. Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1021–22 (W.D. Wis.
2019) (stating that analyses of transition-related health care exclusion in state Medicaid plan “reveal such
small estimated savings . . . that they are both practically and actuarially immaterial. Defendants estimate
that removing the [exclusion] and covering gender-confirming surgeries would cost between $300,000
and $1.2 million annually, which actuarially speaking amounts to one hundredth to three hundredth of
one percent of the State’s share of Wisconsin Medicaid’s annual budget”); Boyden, 341 F. Supp. 3d at
1000–01 (“From an actuarial perspective, there appears to be no dispute that the cost of coverage is
immaterial at 0.1% to 0.2% of the total cost of providing health insurance to state employees, even
adopting defendants’ cost estimation. . . . [T]he court is hard-pressed to find that a reasonable factfinder
could conclude that the cost justification was an ‘exceedingly persuasive’ reason or that this miniscule
cost savings would further ‘important governmental objectives.’ ”); see also TRANSGENDER LEGAL DEF.
& EDUC. FUND, supra note 221, at 13 (citing studies discussing negligible costs of transition-related
healthcare coverage in North Carolina and Alaska, and in U.S. military context); HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN
FOUND., CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2020, at 18 (2020), https://hrc-prod-requests.s3-us-west-2.am
azonaws.com/CEI-2020.pdf?mtime=20200806234745&focal=none
[https://perma.cc/F6QB-B9CT]
(“According to businesses’ reporting to the HRC Foundation, making [transition-related care] . . .
accessible comes at an overall negligible cost to the employers’ overall health insurance plans. This holds
true across industries.”); Brief of Jody L. Herman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee at 18, Edmo v.
Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 19-35017) [hereinafter Herman Amicus Brief]
(analyzing negligible costs of providing transition-related healthcare coverage to incarcerated transgender
people in California based on analysis of claims data from city of San Francisco, private employers, and
U.S. military); William V. Padula, Shiona Heru & Jonathan D. Campbell, Societal Implications of Health
Insurance Coverage for Medically Necessary Services in the U.S. Transgender Population A CostEffectiveness Analysis, 31 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 394, 394 (2015) (“Health insurance coverage for the
U.S. transgender population is affordable and cost-effective, and has a low budget impact on U.S.
society.”); JODY L. HERMAN, WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PROVIDING TRANSITIONRELATED HEALTH CARE COVERAGE IN EMPLOYEE HEALTH BENEFIT PLANS 2 (2013), http://williams
institute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Herman-Cost-Benefit-of-Trans-Health-Benefits-Sept-2013.p
df [https://perma.cc/7HHY-HVPQ] (“Employers report very low costs, if any, from adding transitionrelated coverage to their health benefits plans or from actual utilization of the benefit after it has been
added—with many employers reporting no costs at all.”); CAL. DEP’T OF INS., ECONOMIC IMPACT
ASSESSMENT: GENDER NONDISCRIMINATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE (2012), http://transgender

2021]

TRANSGENDER RIGHTS & THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

159

corrections regularly cover the treatment of far more prevalent and expensive
medical conditions.272 Furthermore, some studies suggest that coverage for
transition surgery in fact reduces costs, given the substantial costs that may
result from untreated gender dysphoria, including those arising from the
development of depression, anxiety, and substance abuse, attempted or
completed self-surgeries, and suicide attempts.273 By providing access to
transition surgery, state departments of corrections acknowledge that the cost
of providing transition surgery is merely “budget dust”;274 it is negligible
when compared to the total cost of providing healthcare to states’
incarcerated populations and may, in fact, reduce cost in the long run by
avoiding foreseeable and dire medical results.
CONCLUSION
Prison healthcare is notoriously inadequate, and nowhere is this more
evident than in the context of transgender healthcare. Historically,
transgender people have routinely been denied access to medically necessary
hormone therapy, surgery, and other gender-affirming procedures; subjected
to cross-gender strip searches; and housed according to their birth sex. But
these policies and practices have begun to change. The past two decades have
witnessed a dramatic shift in prisons providing some, though by no means
all, appropriate care to transgender people.
This Article has traced the historic strides that incarcerated transgender
people have made under the Eighth Amendment, from the rejection of
policies that house transgender people based on their birth sex, to the
requirement that prison officials provide transgender people with access to
lawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Economic-Impact-Assessment-Gender-NondiscriminationIn-Health-Insurance.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TTV-WV7Z] (stating that transition-related healthcare
coverage “will cost little or nothing in the short run and may produce longer-term cost savings and
improved health benefits for transgender people”); CITY & CNTY. OF S.F. HUM. RTS. COMM’N, SAN
FRANCISCO CITY AND COUNTY TRANSGENDER HEALTH BENEFIT 1–2 (2006), http://www.tgender.net/
taw/SanFranciscoTGBenefitUpdateMar3106.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8XZ-4GZP] (stating that transitionrelated healthcare coverage in employee health plans “has proven to be appropriately accessed and
undeniably more affordable than other, often routinely covered, procedures. . . . Unlike the fears
expressed, none of the concerns came to pass. . . . [T]he benefit costs much less to provide than the
reduced rate currently being charged.”).
272. See, e.g., Kosilek, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 247 (“The DOC provides many prisoners with Hepatitis
B medication that costs $18,000 a year. Other prisoners receive dialysis, which is also costly.”).
273. See, e.g., Herman Amicus Brief, supra note 271, at 20 (stating that, by improving the overall
health and well-being of transgender people, transition-related healthcare coverage “can result in costsavings”); CAL. DEP’T OF INS., supra note 271, at 9 (“The evidence suggests that there may be potential
cost savings resulting from the adoption of the proposed regulation [that prohibits the denial of coverage
for transition-related care] in the medium to long term, such as lower costs associated with the high cost
of suicide and attempts at suicide, overall improvements in mental health and lower rates of substance
abuse . . . .”).
274. Declaration of Raymond Edwin Mabus, Jr. in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction ¶ 41, Doe v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 17-cv-1597).
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hormone therapy, social transition, and, most recently, transition surgery.
These momentous changes, which coincide with a broader cultural turn away
from transphobia and toward a collective understanding of transgender
people, have been neither swift nor easy. But they trend in one direction:
toward a recognition of the rights and dignity of transgender people, as they
must under the Eighth Amendment.275

275. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (“The [Eighth] Amendment ‘embodies broad
and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . . ’ against which we must
evaluate penal measures.” (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968))).

